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Essay

Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power
Peter J. Smith†

Federalism, it seems, is ours once again.1 Although not everyone is
quite ready to observe the “new etiquette” of federalism,2 in recent years
the Court has restricted Congress’s affirmative powers to legislate. The
Court has revived limits on both the scope of Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce3 and the means by which Congress may do so;4 on
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments;5 and on
Congress’s authority to empower private parties to enforce federal rights
against recalcitrant states.6

† Attorney, Civil Appellate Staff, U.S. Department of Justice; Associate Professor designate,
George Washington University Law School. I am especially grateful to Thomas Bondy, Mark
Davies, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Alisa Klein, Dana Martin, Sue Pacholski, and Mark Stern
for helping to refine this piece.
1. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (invoking “Our Federalism” to justify
refusal to enjoin pending state court proceedings).
2. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York,
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71 (quoting the “etiquette of federalism” language from
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have regularly dissented from the Court’s recent federalism
decisions. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I expect the
Court’s late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissezfaire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting.”).
3. See Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
4. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
5. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
6. See Kimel, 528 U.S. 62; Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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In contrast, although the Court has articulated a number of “general
restrictions”7 on Congress’s spending power,8 that power remains, at least
at present, an effective source of congressional authority. One of those
“general restrictions” is that Congress may impose binding conditions on
states that accept federal funds only if, as the Court explained in Pennhurst
State School & Hospital v. Halderman,9 the conditions are expressed
“unambiguously.”10 Because that requirement, at least at first blush, is not
particularly restrictive—and because the Court has limited Congress’s other
sources of authority—the federal government increasingly has turned to the
power of the purse as a means of advancing its agenda,11 while advocates
of a more limited federal role have begun to seek more trenchant limits on
that power.12 The spending power is a particularly effective tool when one
considers that most federal spending programs are administered by federal
agencies, whose interpretations of federal statutory provisions are, under
the rule of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,13 entitled
to judicial deference. Indeed, the Court has, despite occasional rumblings to
the contrary,14 validated the administrative state by continuing to defer to
administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretations of statutory regulatory
schemes.15 When Congress legislates within its affirmative powers, it
accordingly may delegate to agencies the authority to determine how its
relatively broad statutory statements of policy should apply in particular
circumstances.
Both the Pennhurst doctrine and the Chevron inquiry turn, at least in
part, on congressional clarity—or, as the tests typically are expressed, on
congressional ambiguity. Under Pennhurst, a court may conclude that
Congress has imposed a condition on the grant of federal funds to a state
recipient only if Congress unambiguously expressed its intent to do so;
7. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
9. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
10. Id. at 17.
11. See, e.g., Adler & Kreimer, supra note 2, at 106; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV.
317, 397 (1997); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. See Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662 (2000) (holding that
“[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do
not warrant Chevron-style deference”); cf. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (holding that the EPA’s construction of the Clean Air Act effected an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power), modified on reh’g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part sub
nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001).
15. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84344. Under Chevron, a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute defers to the agency’s
interpretation if the “statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and if “the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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under Chevron, the existence of statutory ambiguity with respect to a
particular issue requires the reviewing court to defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language. What, then, should a
court do when the terms of a federal-state grant program’s condition are not
fully elaborated in the statute and when the agency charged with enforcing
the statute has issued regulations that purport to define the terms of the
condition? Does congressional ambiguity in defining the terms of the
condition foreclose, under the Pennhurst doctrine, the court from
considering the agency’s interpretation? Or should the court apply
traditional canons of statutory construction—including deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions—to determine if the
agency’s interpretation can bind the state grant recipient?
Suppose, for example, that the statute creating a federal-state grant
program designed to promote strong science education provides that, as a
condition of receiving funds, the state recipient must “assure that all public
school students have reasonably individualized access to technology
education.” Educational experts in the state believe that the best means to
accomplish the program’s goal is to purchase enough computers to ensure a
five-to-one student-to-computer ratio. The Department of Education,
however, has issued a regulation that interprets the condition to require one
science teacher for every ten students. The statutory provision is
ambiguous, and both interpretations of the condition are reasonable; it is
clear that, evaluated under Chevron’s approach, the agency’s interpretation
is valid. If the state follows its own interpretation, can a student who wants
smaller classes sue to enforce the condition? Can the Department of
Education withhold funds until the state complies with the agency’s
interpretation?
Such controversies arise at the crossroads of administrative law and
federalism principles. They raise the question whether Chevron deference,
which is appropriate only when a statute is ambiguous, ever is warranted
when the statutory provision at issue attaches a condition to a state’s receipt
of funds—a provision that must, in order to be effective under Pennhurst,
attach the condition unambiguously. This Essay considers whether the usual
principles of Chevron deference govern the interpretation of ambiguous
statutory provisions in federal-state grant programs. Ordinarily, Congress
provides a blueprint that outlines its objectives, and then relies on
agencies—administrators in a co-equal branch—to implement those
objectives in concrete circumstances. Phrased another way, then, the
question here is whether Congress can continue to rely on agencies when it
legislates pursuant to the spending power.
Resolution of this question depends principally on how one
characterizes Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule. The first approach, which
I call the “accountability model,” views Pennhurst through the lens of
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the later-decided case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.16 Garcia held that federalism-based limits on Congress’s power
to regulate the states inhere largely in the structure of the federal
government itself, in which the interests of states are represented.17 The
accountability model treats Pennhurst’s rule as a structural mechanism to
ensure congressional accountability when Congress imposes burdens on the
states. Under this framework, Congress (which, at least theoretically,
represents the interests of the states), in contradistinction to administrative
agencies (which do not), must unambiguously decide whether to impose a
particular burden on the states. The accountability model thus expresses a
concern about delegation: Congress, and not agencies, should make
important decisions of policy, including whether to alter the federal-state
balance, because only Congress is electorally accountable for such
decisions. Accordingly, under the accountability model, reasonable agency
interpretations of statutory grant conditions are not entitled to deference,
even though Congress, by most conventional canons of statutory
construction, can be thought to have delegated to the agency the authority
to fill in gaps in the statute’s application.
The second approach, which I call the “state choice model,” views
Pennhurst’s rule as a means to ensure notice—and thus fairness—to the
states when a federal grant program imposes a burden on the state
recipients. Under this account, the question of which federal actor (that is,
Congress or the agency) has imposed a condition on the state is not
determinative; the inquiry focuses instead on whether, in light of the
information available when the state accepted federal funds, the state can
fairly be said to have understood the nature of the bargain, and thus had the
opportunity “freely” to “choose” whether to accept the funds. Because a
state can just as readily “ascertain what is expected of it”18 from an agency
regulation as from the statutory text itself, the state choice model accords
Chevron deference to reasonable agency interpretations of statutory grant
conditions.
This Essay argues that the accountability model upsets the delicate
balance that Pennhurst achieved between federal and state interests and
undermines the important values advanced by the Court’s decision in
Chevron. By requiring an unrealistic standard of congressional precision,
the accountability model effectively converts Pennhurst’s rule from an
interpretive tool to a substantive limitation on Congress’s power to regulate
through the spending power. The state choice model, on the other hand,
accommodates the values advanced by Chevron and limits Pennhurst’s

16. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
17. Id. at 550-54.
18. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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application to those cases that involve obvious unfairness to the states. An
agency regulation provides a state with notice of its federal obligations just
as effectively as a statute does, and states accordingly should be bound if
the administering agency has issued an interpretation of the statutory grant
condition before the state accepts funds.
This Essay pays particular attention to the most difficult case for
Chevron deference: when the agency issues its interpretation of the
statutory grant condition after the state accepts funds under the grant
program. Because the accountability model categorically precludes
Chevron deference for agency interpretations of statutory grant conditions,
it a fortiori prohibits deference in such cases. The state choice model, on the
other hand, draws a temporal line for determining the federal government’s
power to bind the states with grant conditions. Because the state choice
model turns on notice—and because a state can hardly be said to have
received notice of an agency interpretation that did not exist when the state
accepted funds—application of that model leads to the conclusion that
agency views cannot retroactively bind state recipients of federal funds.
Although there is an obvious appeal to this approach—and although I
ultimately think that it is the correct approach—there are strong
countervailing (narrative) arguments that the interests served by Chevron
deference are sufficiently weighty to justify application of deference even
to agency interpretations that postdate a state’s receipt of funds. This Essay
therefore considers not only the state choice model, but also other possible
judicial approaches to such cases: (1) entitling the court to interpret de novo
the statute’s application to the particular circumstances at issue, without any
preference for the agency’s or the state’s view; (2) binding the state
recipient to “interpretive rules,” but not to “substantive rules”; and
(3) applying a reformulated nondelegation doctrine. These approaches are
arguably incompatible with Pennhurst’s rule, but I discuss them to illustrate
the limits (and the value) of that rule.
Although such cases of retroactive rulemaking have no perfect solution,
I am largely persuaded that Chevron deference should not apply to agency
interpretations issued after the state accepts funds under the grant program.
The potential unfairness to state recipients—especially in cases in which the
state already has, in good faith reliance on its own reasonable interpretation
of the grant condition, spent the grant funds when the agency issues its
view, or in cases in which the agency reverses its prior view, on which the
state has relied in allocating funds—strongly suggests that the state choice
model is appropriate for resolving this question of retroactivity, and thus
that such retroactive rules should not bind the state—at least not until the
state again agrees to accept funds under the program.
In Part I, I outline the background principles—mainly Pennhurst’s
clear-statement rule and Chevron’s rule of deference—implicated by the
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questions addressed in this Essay. Next, in Part II, I discuss the basic
analytic frameworks for determining whether agency interpretations of
statutory grant conditions can bind state recipients of federal funds. Finally,
in Part III, I focus on the difficult cases in which the agency issues its
interpretation of the grant condition—or reverses its position—after the
state receives funds under the grant program.
I. FRAMING THE QUESTION
A. Agency Interpretations of Federal Statutes: The General Rule of
Chevron Deference
When Congress legislates, it typically paints with a broad brush,
identifying its objectives but leaving more particularized questions of the
application of the statute to the law’s administrators in (usually) the
executive branch. Because Congress cannot possibly legislate with a
specificity that addresses all conceivable circumstances that may arise
under its statutes, agencies regularly promulgate regulations that construe
the federal statutes that they are charged with administering. In a nowfamiliar formulation, the Court, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,19 explained how courts should review an agency’s
construction of the statute that it administers:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.20
The Court’s two-part test is premised on the view that, although the
“judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction,”21 the
“‘power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’”22
19.
20.
21.
22.

467 U.S. 837.
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843 n.9.
Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
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The Court rested Chevron’s principle of deference to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions on at least two grounds.
First, the Court recognized that agencies have specialized expertise. The
Court explained that the “decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute”
often involves “‘reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of
the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations.’”23 Judges, on the other hand, “are not experts in the field.”24
Second, the Court’s decision was informed by the principle of
separation of powers. The Court recognized that Congress cannot legislate
with a “level of specificity” that would ensure that all eventualities are
resolved by simple reference to the terms of the statute. 25 The Court noted,
moreover, that agency decisionmaking often involves balancing and
accommodating competing policy goals. Judges not only “are not experts,”
but also “are not part of either political branch of the Government.”26
Although agencies “are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices.”27 Chevron therefore
“establishes a presumption that ambiguities are to be resolved (within the
bounds of reasonable interpretation) by the administering agency.”28
The Court concluded by fusing these two bases for the principle of
deference to agency interpretations:
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such
a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public

23. Id. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
24. Id. at 865.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1664 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). In Justice Breyer’s view, the Court before Chevron already
valued the agencies’ “‘specialized experience’” by looking to agency views “‘for guidance.’” Id.
at 1667 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 140 (1944)).
Chevron “made no relevant change” but merely “focused upon an additional, separate legal reason
for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated to the agency
the legal authority to make those determinations.” Id. at 1667-68.
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interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such
responsibilities in the political branches.”29
The Court’s decision in Chevron has spawned a voluminous
literature,30 and commentators have divided over the virtues of the
decision.31 The correctness of the Court’s approach in Chevron, however, is
beyond the scope of this Essay. Instead, I focus here on Chevron’s
requirement that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory language—and specifically on how this requirement
applies when agencies interpret statutes governing conditional federal
grants to states. To understand fully how Chevron should apply in that
context, it is useful to consider the values advanced—and the values
diminished—by Chevron’s approach.
Chevron’s framework for deference was an attempt to accommodate
various concerns regarding separation of powers and regulatory efficiency.
Among others, those concerns include: (1) maintaining Congress’s
legislative supremacy; (2) preserving the judiciary’s authority to “say what
the law is”; (3) enabling executive agencies to decide in the first instance
how best to enforce the law; (4) ensuring that agencies can apply their
29. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
30. One commentator has quipped that “[t]he loss of forests necessary to make the paper to
print all of the articles written on the proper standard of review in interpreting statutes following
[Chevron] might well have justified requiring the Supreme Court to issue an environmental
impact statement along with the opinion.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of
Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 229 n.116 (1994).
31. Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that
Chevron is best understood and defended as a frank recognition that sometimes
interpretation is not simply a matter of uncovering legislative will, but also involves
extratextual considerations of various kinds, including judgments about how a statute is
best or most sensibly implemented. Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that these
judgments of policy and principle should be made by administrators rather than judges.
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2087-88
(1990). Peter Strauss has praised Chevron for a different reason. He noted that
[t]he Supreme Court’s practical inability in most cases to give its own precise
renditions of statutory meaning virtually assures that circuit readings will be diverse.
By removing the responsibility for precision from the courts of appeals, the Chevron
rule subdues this diversity, and thus enhances the probability of uniform national
administration of the laws.
Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987)
(citation omitted).
On the other hand, Cynthia Farina has criticized Chevron on the ground that it conflicts with
the rationale for the delegation doctrine: “‘Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative
powers broadly—and the courts have upheld such delegation—because there is court review to
assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory limits.’” Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 452, 487 (1989) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal,
J., concurring)); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992) (discussing the “draconian implications of the [Chevron] doctrine for
the balance of power among the branches”).
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particularized expertise in enforcing the law; and (5) providing a judicial
check on the power of electorally unaccountable agencies to usurp
Congress’s legislative function.
By leaving to the agency the authority to issue binding interpretations
of statutory provisions even when the Court, if confronted independently
with the meaning of the provision, would construe its meaning
differently,32 the Court necessarily undermined to some degree the second
interest above—the judiciary’s role as final arbiter of the meaning of
federal law. The decision in Chevron recognized, however, that deference
does not simply amount to judicial abdication, because Congress often has
intended to leave some matters of enforcement policy to agencies;
deference thus respects that intent.33 With Chevron as a background rule of
construction, moreover, Congress knows when it legislates that ambiguous
legislative statements and broad delegations of policymaking authority will
result in judicial approval of reasonable agency interpretations; the decision
to do so, given Chevron’s rule, can be taken as tacit approval of reasonable
agency enforcement policies. Indeed, Congress can limit agency authority
simply by filling some of the gaps in its enactments with definitive
legislative statements. The decision thus does not irreparably undermine the
first two interests noted above. For many of the same reasons, the decision
in Chevron does no significant harm to the fifth concern above—providing
a judicial check on the power of electorally unaccountable agencies to
usurp Congress’s legislative function—because agency interpretations that
are inconsistent with Congress’s legislative scheme are impermissible, even
under Chevron.34 Finally, Chevron plainly promotes the development of
agency expertise and entitles agencies to apply that expertise to matters of
governance.35 Judges, the Court explained, “are not experts,”36 and
enforcing federal law often requires “‘a full understanding of the force of
the statutory policy in the given situation[, which generally] has depended
upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations.’”37
In addition, by requiring judicial deference to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, the decision in Chevron
recognizes the realities of executive enforcement. Given limited resources,
32. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
33. Id. at 843 (“‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
. . . created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974))). But see Merrill, supra note 31, at 979 (“Yet how do we know that Congress, the ultimate
democratic trump card, wants ambiguities and gaps to be resolved by agencies rather than by
courts?”).
34. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
35. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 2088-89.
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
37. Id. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)).
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the executive branch must make difficult decisions about how best to carry
out statutory mandates. Because the agencies are electorally accountable
derivatively through the President, “it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices.”38 More
important for this discussion, Chevron’s recognition of the need for
executive enforcement discretion reflects an understanding of the inherent
malleability of language. Even the best-intentioned Congress, one that
strives to answer all difficult policy questions in its legislation, cannot
anticipate every conceivable set of circumstances that might arise. Indeed, it
is the art of the lawyer to find ambiguity in even the clearest of statutory
provisions, and no amount of legislative dedication can produce laws at
such a level of specificity that all eventualities can be resolved by simple
reference to the terms of the statute. As discussed below, virtually every
statutory definition raises a new host of interpretive difficulties. It is far
from clear, moreover, that such legislative precision is desirable;
thoroughness often is the enemy of simplicity, and statutes that strive to
anticipate any eventuality risk sacrificing clarity to complexity. By
deferring to reasonable agency interpretations, Chevron credits the reality
that Congress cannot (and perhaps should not) attempt to answer every
policy-based question raised by a regulatory initiative.
B. Congress’s Power Under the Spending Clause
1. General Principles
This Essay asks whether the usual principles of Chevron deference
should apply when Congress has enacted the statutory provision at issue
pursuant to the spending power. Although the Constitution does not speak
specifically of Congress’s power to “spend,” the Court has long interpreted
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, which empowers Congress to “provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,”39 as
authorization for Congress to spend funds to further national interests.40
The Court, moreover, has left largely to Congress the determination of what
promotes the “general welfare.”41 And “the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the
38. Id. at 865.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
40. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987); United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). See generally David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1
(1994) (providing an overview of the spending power and of misconceptions about its scope).
41. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (“The line must still be drawn between
one welfare and another, between particular and general. . . . The discretion, however, is not
confined to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”).
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direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”42 In addition,
Congress may “further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of
federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives.”43 Therefore, “objectives not thought to be within
Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds.”44 States, of course, are frequent recipients of such federal grants
with strings attached.
Although the Court has not invalidated a congressional spending clause
enactment since 1936,45 it has identified a number of (at least theoretical)
limits on that power. First, as the language of the constitutional grant of
authority makes clear, “the exercise of the spending power must be in
pursuit of ‘the general welfare,’”46 although, as noted above, the Court
generally defers to Congress’s view of the meaning of that term. Second,
“conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’” 47 Third,
the spending power “may not be used to induce the States to engage in
activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”48 Fourth, the
financial inducement offered by Congress must not “be so coercive as to
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”49 Finally—and
most important, for purposes of this Essay—if Congress desires to place a

42. Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
43. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
44. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 65). For a provocative article about the
difference between congressional ends and means in the Spending Clause context, see Engdahl,
supra note 40.
45. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 68-78 (invalidating various provisions of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 because they “invade[d] the reserved rights of the states” and because
they had a “coercive purpose and intent”). The Court sharply changed direction one year later in
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937), which upheld a tax imposed on
employers by the Social Security Act and conditional grants under that statute, and rejected the
claim that the Act “involv[ed] the coercion of the States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment
or of restrictions implicit in our federal form of government.”
46. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 and citing Helvering, 301
U.S. at 640-41, and Butler, 297 U.S. at 65).
47. Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). This limitation is often referred to as a “germaneness” or “relatedness” limitation. See
id. at 208 n.3.
48. Id. at 210. The Court has referred to this limitation as the “independent constitutional bar”
limitation. Id.
49. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590). Notwithstanding this limit on
the spending power, the Court has suggested that “[i]f Congress enact[s a statute] with the ulterior
purpose of tempting [the states] to yield, that purpose may be effectively frustrated by the simple
expedient of not yielding.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923). Such a view of
state choice, however, presumably would apply regardless of how tempting the offer is.
Nevertheless, the Court continues to articulate the “coercion” limitation on the spending power,
and at least some members of the judiciary have indicated a willingness to take that limitation
seriously. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(opinion of Luttig, J.).
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condition on the States’ receipt of federal funds, “it must do so
unambiguously.”50
2. The Pennhurst Doctrine
The Court announced the requirement of congressional clarity in
establishing conditions on federal grants in Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman.51 In Pennhurst, the Court addressed the meaning of
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,52
a “federal-state grant program whereby the Federal Government provides
financial assistance to participating States to aid them in creating programs
to care for and treat the developmentally disabled.”53 Under the Act, states
“are given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth in the Act
or forgoing the benefits of federal funding.”54 Pennsylvania had accepted
funds under the Act, and it was undisputed (in light of the district court’s
findings) that conditions at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital were
“not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged
by staff members, but also inadequate for the ‘habilitation’ of the
retarded.”55 The question presented was whether conditions at the hospital
violated the obligations that the Act imposed on recipient states.
Specifically, residents of the hospital claimed that their treatment
violated 42 U.S.C. § 6010, the “bill of rights” provision of the Act, which
generally stated Congress’s “findings” with respect to the “rights” of
persons with developmental disabilities.56 The “enabling” provisions of the
Act, in contrast, required that “any State desiring financial assistance
submit an overall plan satisfactory to the Secretary of HHS,” and that the
Secretary could approve the plan only if it complied “with several specific
conditions set forth in [42 U.S.C.] § 6063.”57

50. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). See generally
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 189
(“Of these four conditions, only the [clear-statement rule] has any effect on structuring spending
power.”).
51. 451 U.S. 1.
52. 89 Stat. 486 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. § 15001 (Law. Co-op., LEXIS through
2000 legislation)).
53. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7.
56. The provision states, in relevant part, that (1) “[p]ersons with developmental disabilities
have a right to appropriate treatment”; (2) such treatment “should be designed to maximize the
developmental potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive
of the person’s personal liberty”; and (3) the “Federal Government and the States both have an
obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any institutio[n] . . . that—(A) does not
provide treatment . . . which is appropriate to the needs of such person; or (B) does not meet the
following minimum standards.” Id. at 13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976)).
57. Id. at 13-14.
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The Court first noted that
legislation enacted pursuant to the spending clause is much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests
on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms
of the “contract.”58
Ostensibly applying contract principles—and drawing from its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence—the Court concluded that “[t]here can, of
course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or
is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”59 Accordingly, “if Congress
intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously.”60 The Court reasoned that “[b]y insisting that Congress
speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.”61
Applying these principles, the Court concluded that “the ‘findings’ in
§ 6010, when viewed in the context of the more specific provisions of the
Act, represent general statements of federal policy, not newly created legal
duties.”62 The Court noted that when “Congress intended to impose
conditions on the grant of federal funds, as in [other sections of the Act], it
proved capable of doing so in clear terms.”63 Viewed in that context, the
“absence of conditional language in § 6010” led the Court to conclude that
the enumerated “rights” were mere precatory statements by Congress.64
The Court found those rights to be “largely indeterminate”; as a result,
“Congress fell well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by
accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with
§ 6010.”65
As this discussion makes clear, the Court in Pennhurst was faced
principally with the interpretive task of determining whether a particular
provision of a grant statute expressed a mere hortatory statement of federal

58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees v. Dep’t of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id. at 22-23.
63. Id. at 23.
64. Id. at 23-27 (noting the “well-settled distinction between congressional ‘encouragement’
of state programs and the imposition of binding obligations on the States,” and stating that
Congress “understood the difference, financial and otherwise, between encouraging a specified
type of treatment and mandating it”).
65. Id. at 24-25. The Court also rejected the suggestion that Congress passed the Act pursuant
to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and that, in doing so, Congress intended to
create rights enforceable against the states. See id. at 18-22.
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policy, or rather was intended to bind state recipients of funds under the
program. The decision, however, can also be read—especially when
considered in light of later-decided federalism cases—as an attempt to
balance a number of federalism-based concerns. Those concerns include:
(1) protecting state autonomy and maximizing state voluntary choice;
(2) limiting Congress’s authority to accomplish indirectly what it could not
accomplish directly through exercise of its affirmative legislative powers;
(3) promoting transparency in legislation and increasing the chance that
Congress considers the interests of the states when it imposes burdens on
them; (4) ensuring state compliance with obligations fairly imposed by
federal law; and (5) enabling Congress to address problems of national
importance through its chosen means.
To be sure, Pennhurst is susceptible to criticism for undervaluing the
latter two interests and overvaluing the first two. For example, Pennhurst’s
rule of construction may in some cases defeat congressional intent that has
not been expressed with the talismanic precision required by the Court. This
is especially likely when the Court applies the rule to statutory provisions
enacted before the Court decided Pennhurst and thus for which Congress
did not have the benefit of knowing the Court’s expectations of clarity.66
And, as the Court’s recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
demonstrates, zealous judicial protection of state autonomy risks
undermining assurances that states will abide limitations validly imposed
by federal law.67 Insisting on particular legislative formulations no doubt
diminishes the likelihood that statutory provisions will be interpreted to
impose binding conditions on states, and thus frees states from the
obligation to comply with what are at times costly burdens suggested by
federal law; but doing so also decreases, by some incalculable amount, the
likelihood that states will conform their conduct to the limits that Congress
actually intended to impose. Similarly, although some commentators (and
members of the Court) have expressed concern about the “back door” of the
spending clause68—that is, the opportunity that the spending power
provides Congress to accomplish ends that it could not address through its
direct regulatory authority—all modern authorities (including the Court’s
66. But cf. Lessig, supra note 50, at 188 (“If the Court’s job were simply to find Congress’s
meaning, then it would have no right to impose on Congress anything like a clear statement rule.
But the Court is not simply the handmaiden of Congress. Its duty is also to the Constitution. The
question is how best it can satisfy that duty.”).
67. Under current doctrine, Congress may validly impose binding requirements, such as
minimum wages and antidiscrimination mandates, on states, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), but may not
authorize private suits to enforce those rights unless Congress acts to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999).
68. E.g., Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1103 (1987).
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decisions) agree that Congress may, by invoking its spending power, exert
influence over affairs otherwise outside of the scope of federal authority.69
The first and third interests described above also serve as the seeds of
the competing frameworks for analyzing the question presented in this
Essay. The Court’s concern for state voluntary choice underscores the
importance of notice to the states of the conditions that they will assume in
accepting federal funds; the Court’s insistence on congressional clarity
represents the Court’s attempt to ensure that Congress (and Congress alone)
decides whether to impose a burden on the states. The latter concern forms
the basis of the accountability model, and the former forms the basis of the
state choice model. I discuss these models of interpreting Pennhurst below
in Part II.
This brief discussion of Pennhurst—like the discussion above of
Chevron—is not intended to suggest that the decision perfectly
accommodated the identified interests, or even that all of those interests
require judicial protection. My personal opinion is that Pennhurst’s rule is
unnecessary and that Chevron’s is ultimately desirable. But, at least as long
as Pennhurst and Chevron are the governing precedents, the interests
advanced by these decisions inform the proper approach to deciding
whether Chevron deference should apply to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutory grant conditions.
In light of the values advanced by these decisions, how does one
answer this question? One could view this as an administrative law
question, and of course in some sense it is. Indeed, the question is whether
to defer to an entire class of agency interpretations: those that construe
conditions in federal-state grant programs. But it is also a federalism
question, and it requires the weighing of interests that are not easily
quantified: state autonomy and voluntary choice, on the one hand, and
uniformity of federal law, congressional flexibility, executive enforcement
discretion, and agency expertise, on the other. I turn now to the principal
approaches, with an eye towards balancing these competing interests.
II. RECONCILING PENNHURST AND CHEVRON: COMPETING FRAMEWORKS
A. The Case for the Accountability Model
Return for a moment to the hypothetical science education grant
program, under which a state receiving funds must “assure that all public
school students have reasonably individualized access to technology
education.” Recall that the state believes that the best way to satisfy the
69. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936); Baker, supra note 11, at 1916.
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requirement is to use the funds to purchase enough computers to ensure a
five-to-one student-to-computer ratio, but that the Department of Education
has decided that the condition requires school districts to hire enough
teachers to maintain a ten-to-one student-to-teacher ratio in all science
classes. It is instructive to consider this conflict—and the potential
balancing of Chevron’s and Pennhurst’s values—from the perspective of a
federalist, or one who is solicitous of states’ rights.
First, the state arguably has no choice but to accept the funds.70 Second,
by limiting the states’ discretion in addressing educational issues, the
hypothetical grant program seeks to compel the states to take action in an
area that is thought to be quintessentially local.71 Third, the agency’s view,
although reasonable, is in no sense compelled by the statute’s text.
Moreover, as suggested above, Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule can be
seen as ensuring that the structural protections for the states function
effectively. Specifically, the rule increases the chance that Congress will
consider the interests of the states when it imposes burdens on them. In so
doing, the rule helps to ensure that Congress’s decision to impose such
burdens is made plain to voters, who can decide whether their states should
bear such burdens, and to states, which certainly will inform their voters of
the burdens imposed by Congress. Although the Court decided Pennhurst
four years before it decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,72 Pennhurst’s rule takes on new importance in light of the later
decision in Garcia. That decision left protection for state autonomy
primarily to the federalist structure.73 Because representation in Congress is
state-based, state constituencies have a voice in Congress through their
elected federal representatives, whom the voters may remove from office if
they fail adequately to respect state prerogatives.74 The theory, of course, is
that Congress will consider the states’ interests in maintaining local
autonomy when it decides how expansive federal regulation should be (or,
to state it the other way, how much power to devolve, or leave, to the
states).

70. Professor Lynn Baker, for example, has argued that because the federal government has
“a monopoly power over the various sources of state revenue,” states (at least, that is, states that
would not, if given a completely free choice, accept the conditions attached) must acquiesce in the
federal conditions in order to secure a “return” of the state’s “own” money. Baker, supra note 11,
at 1935-36; see also id. at 1973-74 (discussing coercion). I briefly respond to this argument infra
notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
72. 469 U.S. 528.
73. Id. at 550-54.
74. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839-45 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954).
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Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule forces Congress to confront the
question whether states should be required to comply with (what often are)
costly provisions of federal law, and thus ensures that the structural
protections on which the Court relied in Garcia operate properly.75
Allowing agencies in effect to impose conditions on the states’ receipt of
federal funds risks undermining these protections, and creates the potential
that agencies will impose conditions that were not within Congress’s
contemplation.76 This is the premise of the accountability model, through
which the federalist views Pennhurst to resolve whether agency
interpretations of grant conditions can bind state recipients.77
The accountability model thus treats as paramount Pennhurst’s
structural protections. A court applying the accountability model to
determine what obligations a state has assumed in accepting federal funds
focuses on the grant statute as enacted by Congress. Because the model’s
premise is that Congress—and Congress alone—should decide, with full
transparency, what burdens the states should bear in accepting federal
funds, it categorically precludes consideration of agency interpretations to
discern the meaning of statutory provisions that, by most conventional
75. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 856 (3d ed. 2000); Lessig,
supra note 50, at 207.
76. Of course, there may be little reason to doubt the efficacy of these structural protections
even absent Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule. Because states rarely are eager to assume costly
obligations imposed by federal law, state officials are likely to protest—loudly, publicly, and
often—whenever the federal government contends that federal law requires the state to take (or
refrain from taking) action that the state would not take (or refrain from taking) if federal law did
not so require. Indeed, this same criticism applies to the Court’s decision in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which prohibits Congress from directing state legislative action
largely on the grounds that when Congress orders the states to take regulatory action, the political
accountability of federal officials is undermined. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State
Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199 (critiquing the formalism of
the Court’s anticommandeering decisions); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits
of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (critiquing the Court’s categorical
prohibition of executive commandeering, and proposing a more nuanced approach to judicial
enforcement of federalism limits).
More importantly, before the Court’s decision in Pennhurst, the courts determined whether
Congress had attached conditions to the grant of federal funds according to traditional canons of
statutory construction. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979) (holding, after
“carefully analyz[ing] the four factors that Cort [v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),] identifies as
indicative of” congressional intent, that Title IX authorizes a private right of action against a
recipient of federal funds); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 407-15 (1970) (holding, after
examining the language and legislative history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program, as well as “basic axiom[s]” of statutory construction, that the statute required state
recipients to reevaluate equations for determining need). At bottom, then, even in the prePennhurst regime, courts concluded that state recipients of federal funds were bound by a
particular statutory provision only when Congress so intended. And because states presumably
were aware of how courts divined congressional intent, a court’s conclusion that Congress
intended to attach a particular string to a federal grant would not (at least in theory) come as a
surprise to the state.
77. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (adopting
the dissenting panel opinion of Luttig, J., originally at 86 F.3d 1337, 1347 (4th Cir. 1996) (panel
opinion) (Luttig, J., dissenting), as the majority opinion after a brief per curiam opinion).
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canons of interpretation, can be thought to have delegated to an agency the
authority to fill in gaps in the statute’s application. Under the accountability
model, therefore, Chevron deference is categorically inappropriate.78
In this sense, the accountability model expresses a concern about
delegation. As Professor Sunstein recently observed, clear-statement rules
can be understood as “nondelegation canons,” because they are rules that
“forbid administrative agencies from making decisions on their own.”79
According to this account, the traditional nondelegation doctrine, which has
proved to be difficult to administer, has been replaced by “a series of more
specific and smaller” nondelegation doctrines that “represent a salutary
kind of democracy-forcing minimalism, designed to ensure that certain
choices are made by an institution with a superior democratic pedigree.”80
These canons, typically expressed as clear-statement rules similar to
Pennhurst’s, are an effort to link “important interests” with “appropriate
institutional design.”81 The interest served by Pennhurst’s rule, of course, is
state autonomy, which (on this account) finds its protection principally
in the institutional structure of Congress. In the science education
hypothetical, for example, there is no obvious indication that Congress was
concerned about class size; allowing the agency in effect to override the
state’s judgment as to the best means to accomplish Congress’s broadly
stated goal not only creates the potential that the agency has attempted to
impose a condition that was not within Congress’s contemplation, but also
risks doing so at the expense of important values of federalism.82
A related (and specifically federalism-based) theoretical justification
for the accountability model is that to bind the state to the agency’s view
78. Note also that application of the accountability model often will result in different
standards and obligations depending on whether a recipient of federal funds is a state or private
entity. Pennhurst’s rule applies only to state recipients of federal funds. Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice,
we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.”). When Congress imposes conditions on private recipients of federal funds, the
same federalism concerns are not present. Application of the accountability model to grant
programs that provide funds to both private and state entities therefore creates the possibility that
an agency interpretation of an ambiguous condition will, under Chevron, bind the private
recipients but not the state ones. Under the accountability model, therefore, the same statutory
grant provision can have different meanings, depending on the status of the party that accepts
funds.
79. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000).
80. Id. at 316-17.
81. Id. at 317.
82. There is, however, a significant limitation in treating Pennhurst’s rule according to this
account. The other nondelegation canons that Professor Sunstein discusses do not substantially
impair an entire source of Congress’s affirmative authority. Treating Pennhurst’s clear-statement
rule as a nondelegation canon (that is, viewing Pennhurst through the accountability model)
arguably imposes more than a minor procedural obstacle to Congress’s ability to legislate
pursuant to the spending power, instead converting that rule into a substantive limitation on
Congress’s power to spend with strings attached. It is perhaps for this reason that Professor
Sunstein does not include Pennhurst’s rule in his discussion of the nondelegation canons.
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would diminish the efficacy of a “second-best” rule.83 In the federalism
context, an advocate of state autonomy might consider the ideal rule to be a
direct limit on Congress’s authority to accomplish through the spending
power what it could not accomplish through its other affirmative powers.
Such rules, however, often in practice have not been sustainable.84 As a
result, advocates of vigorous limits on federal authority have settled for
procedural or interpretive rules that create an obstacle, however small, to
Congress’s ability to alter the federal-state balance.85 Pennhurst’s clearstatement rule is a classic second-best federalism rule: It does not prevent
Congress from invoking its spending power to impose requirements on the
states, but instead only heightens Congress’s burden in so doing. Allowing
agencies effectively to impose conditions takes away at least some of the
bite of Pennhurst’s rule and thus weakens one of the only viable
mechanisms that exist to protect the states.
As I explain below,86 however, the accountability model has not been
the majority approach to answering whether Pennhurst’s second-best rule
forecloses Chevron deference for agency interpretations of statutory grant
conditions that are ambiguous as applied to particular circumstances.87

83. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 50, at 131.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see also Nat’l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
85. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
86. See infra notes 124-136 and accompanying text.
87. Indeed, the Court in Pennhurst itself suggested that agency interpretations of grant
conditions could, under appropriate circumstances, bind a state recipient. As explained above,
Pennhurst concerned whether a provision of a federal statute that stated generalized congressional
aspirations created rights enforceable by individuals whom the statute was designed to benefit.
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1981). The Court’s decision
turned on Congress’s failure to indicate clearly that the provision stated a binding condition on the
states’ receipt of funds under the Act. The Court did not address, however, the degree of
specificity required once Congress unambiguously imposes some condition on the receipt of
funds. If anything, the Court’s decision in Pennhurst supports the view that agency interpretations
of statutory grant conditions can, in appropriate circumstances, bind state recipients of federal
funds. Because the Court concluded that in the Act’s “bill of rights” provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6010
(1976), Congress did not unambiguously create a condition for the receipt of federal funds under
the Act, the Court had no occasion to consider the precise contours of any condition imposed by
the Act. In reaching its conclusion that Congress did not clearly intend the provision to be a
condition, however, the Court relied in part on the fact that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the agency charged with enforcing the Act, had concluded that “[n]o authority was
included in the Act to allow the Department to withhold funds from States on the basis of failure
to meet the findings” of the bill of rights provision. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 23 (quoting
Developmental Disabilities Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 31,006 (May 9, 1980)). The Court reasoned
that “it strains credulity to argue that participating States should have known of their ‘obligations’
under § 6010 when the Secretary of HHS . . . has never understood § 6010 to impose conditions
on participating States.” Id. at 25. In considering the agency’s interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, the Court did not purport to apply any form of (pre-Chevron) deference;
indeed, the Court suggested that the Secretary’s position merely confirmed that the Act did not
clearly impose any condition. Nevertheless, by referring to the Secretary’s published view in
determining whether states “should have known of their ‘obligations’” under the Act, the Court
implied that an agency’s interpretation of a statutorily expressed condition might suffice to give

SMITHFINAL.DOC

1206

APRIL 12, 2001 4/12/01 12:27 PM

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 110: 1187

Nevertheless, the basic approach has informed some recent judicial
decisions. Most notable is the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Virginia
Department of Education v. Riley,88 which involved an ambiguous
condition imposed by the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).89
Rejecting the Department of Education’s interpretation of the provision, the
court held that Chevron deference was inappropriate90 because it is
“axiomatic that statutory ambiguity defeats altogether a claim by the
Federal Government that Congress has unambiguously conditioned the
States’ receipt of federal monies in the manner asserted.”91 The Court
therefore invoked what I have described here as the accountability model.92
states adequate notice of the conditions with which they must comply upon accepting federal
funds.
88. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
89. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1994) (§ 1420 was repealed in 1997). Section 1412(1) provided
that all state recipients must “have in effect a policy that assures all children with disabilities the
right to a free appropriate public education.” See id. § 1412(1) (repealed in 1997).
90. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561-72 (reproducing Judge Luttig’s dissent in the panel opinion after a
brief per curiam opinion by the majority). Six members of the court (including Judge Luttig)
adopted as their own without change Judge Luttig’s dissent from the panel decision. See id. at 560
(opinion of Luttig, J., joined by Wilkinson, C.J., and Russell, Widener, Wilkins, and Williams,
JJ.). Three other judges concurred in the judgment and expressly concurred in Part I of Judge
Luttig’s opinion, which contained Judge Luttig’s conclusion that Congress had not spoken with
the requisite clarity and included his conclusion that Chevron deference would be inappropriate.
Judge Niemeyer wrote a separate opinion concurring “in part I of the opinion adopted by the
majority and in the judgment of the court.” Id. at 572 (Niemeyer, J., concurring in part). Judge
Hamilton, joined by Judge Ervin, wrote a separate opinion, stating: “Because Part I of the
majority opinion, with which I am in complete accord, adequately disposes of the matter, I would
not reach the Tenth Amendment analysis. Accordingly, I concur in Part I of the majority opinion
and in the judgment of the court.” Id. (Hamilton, J., concurring in the judgment). Two judges
concurred in the judgment. Judge Michael wrote a separate opinion, stating: “Because I agree with
the point in the majority’s adopted opinion that the right here can be forfeited, I concur in the
judgment.” Id. (Michael, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Motz filed a separate opinion,
stating:
For many of the reasons explained in Part I of Judge Luttig’s dissent from the opinion
of the panel majority, I do not believe Congress has unambiguously required the states
to provide educational services to disabled children who have been suspended or
expelled for misconduct unrelated to their disabilities. Accordingly, I join the court’s
judgment.
Id. (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment). Therefore, at least nine judges (and possibly ten)
agreed that the Pennhurst doctrine prevents application of Chevron deference to an agency
regulation that construes a statutory condition on the grant of federal funds to the states.
91. Id. at 567. Indeed, the court reasoned that because Garcia “has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.” Id. at 567
(quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)). Judge Murnaghan dissented, reiterating
his belief, expressed in his opinion for the panel majority, that the statute was unambiguous in its
requirement that states provide educational services. Id. at 579 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Judge
Hall filed a separate dissent. He agreed with the majority that the provision of IDEA at issue “is
arguably not an unambiguous expression of Congressional intent that such services be provided,”
but “disagree[d] with the majority’s view that ‘the deference that we ordinarily afford agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes is inapplicable in a case such as this.’” Id. at 580 (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1351 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig,
J., dissenting)). In Judge Hall’s view, the issue was “whether we will require that Congress itself
define in unmistakable statutory terms each and every string that is or may ever be attached to a
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State’s receipt of funds under a cooperative funding program,” or instead will “defer to a
reasonable interpretation made by the federal agency to which Congress has delegated the job of
operating the program.” Id. He argued that in “choosing the former, the majority eviscerates the
rule of Chevron and establishes a ‘clear-statement rule’ that is as unprecedented as it is
unworkable.” Id.
Judge Hall also pointed out an anomaly created by the court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit in
recent years has applied Chevron deference (or recognized the applicability of Chevron’s
framework) to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions in federal-state
grant programs when the agency interpretation favors, as opposed to burdens, the state. As a
result, the current state of the law in the Fourth Circuit, in light of Riley, is that when a private
party has a dispute with a state about the proper interpretation of a condition in a federal grant
program, the court applies Chevron if the state agrees with the agency’s interpretation. When, on
the other hand, the state disagrees with the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous-conditioncreating statutory provision, the court refuses to apply Chevron and resolves the dispute in favor
of the state. See Rehab. Ass’n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994) (recognizing the
applicability of Chevron’s framework to the question of whether a spending enactment imposes a
burden on states); Mowbray v. Kozlowski, 914 F.2d 593, 600-01 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation of a Spending Clause enactment that benefited a
state).
The Seventh Circuit followed Riley in Doe v. Board of Education, 115 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir.
1997), but did not discuss the Chevron issue. Cf. Cefalu v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.,
103 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 1997) (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (“The IDEA does not unambiguously
condition the State’s receipt of federal funds on its proving the infeasibility of providing services
to disabled students attending private school voluntarily.”). A district court in Arizona, on the
other hand, disagreed with Riley, concluding that IDEA clearly imposed a duty to provide
educational services to students disciplined for non-disability-related reasons, and that, in any
event, the Department of Education’s interpretation is entitled to deference. Magyar v. Tucson
Unified Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423, 1436-40 (D. Ariz. 1997). The court did not discuss the
Pennhurst issue. Less than four months after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Riley (and one month
after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe), Congress amended IDEA to ensure that states
provide educational services even to disabled children expelled from school for misconduct
unrelated to their disabilities. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17, § 612(a)(1)(A), 111 Stat. 37, 60 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(1)(A)
(West 2000)). The Senate Report stated that the amendment was a “clarification[].” S. REP. NO.
105-17, at 11 (1997); see also Amos v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d 589,
614-15 n.* (4th Cir. 1997) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part) (calling the majority’s reliance on
Riley “questionable” in light of the IDEA amendment).
92. As a doctrinal matter, the Fourth Circuit’s decision seems clearly incorrect. In Cedar
Rapids Community School District v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999), and Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984), the Supreme Court deferred to regulations of the
Department of Education in deciding that IDEA (and its predecessor, the Education of the
Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5)) imposed specific conditions on state
grant recipients. See Garret F., 526 U.S. at 68-69 (holding that IDEA “requires a public school
district in a participating State to provide a ventilator-dependent student with certain nursing
services during school hours”); Tatro, 468 U.S. at 895 (holding that EHA required grant recipients
to provide disabled students with certain catheterization services during school hours); see also
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 n.8 (1988) (holding that the Department of Education’s
definition of the phrase “change in placement,” which Congress stated in IDEA but did not define
with specificity, is entitled to Chevron deference). Indeed, the Court in Tatro noted that “[t]he
obligation to provide special education and related services is expressly phrased as a ‘conditio[n]’
for a state to receive funds under the Act,” 20 U.S.C. § 1412, and thus that application of those
requirements did not violate Pennhurst. 468 U.S. at 891 n.8.
In addition, the Supreme Court has made clear in Spending Clause cases decided after
Gregory that Pennhurst’s clear-statement principle does not require Congress unambiguously to
explain how a generalized prescription will apply in every conceivable particularized application.
See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649-53 (1999) (“Congress need
not ‘specifically identify and proscribe’ each condition in the legislation.” (quoting Bennett v. Ky.
Dep’t. of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1985))); see also Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790
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B. Congressional Ambiguity and Interpretive Difficulties:
Levels of Generality and the Error of the Accountability Model
The federalist thus can construct a coherent defense of the
accountability model. But what if the question—whether agency
interpretations of statutory grant conditions are entitled to deference—is
viewed from the perspective of Congress? When Congress legislates, it
generally relies on administrative agencies—parts of a co-equal branch of
government—to implement its broad mandates. The accountability model,
however, requires Congress to legislate at an impossible level of specificity;
it simply is not feasible for Congress to anticipate every eventuality that
may arise under one of its programs. As discussed above, when applied
only to the inquiry of whether Congress has imposed some burden on the
states, Pennhurst promotes transparency in congressional lawmaking,
encourages Congress to confront squarely whether it should alter the
federal-state balance, but does not significantly impair Congress’s power to
impose binding obligations on the states. So interpreted, Pennhurst’s rule
is, at bottom, merely an interpretive tool that Congress can realistically
satisfy; it surely is not burdensome to the legislative process to identify a
particular provision of a statute as an express condition on the grant of
funds.
To interpret Pennhurst, as does the accountability model, as a broader
rule of construction for any particularized application of a statutory
condition, however, effectively turns the rule from an interpretive tool into
a substantive limitation on Congress’s authority to regulate through
Spending Clause legislation. In so doing, the accountability model’s view
of the clear-statement rule undermines a number of the values served by
Chevron and Pennhurst with no significant corresponding benefit. The
problem with the accountability model becomes apparent when one
considers the following hypothetical situations.
First, consider the statutory provision at issue in Riley. There was no
dispute that IDEA imposed on the states, as a condition on the receipt of
funds through the program, the obligation to “assure[] all children with
disabilities the right to a free appropriate public education.”93 The court

n.17 (1983) (holding that Pennhurst applies to determine when Congress has imposed a condition,
not to determine the remedies available against a noncomplying state). Justice Kennedy, however,
has, in dissent, indicated a willingness to apply the model. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (arguing that agency regulations neither “could [n]or did provide states the notice
required by our Spending Clause principles”). Justice Kennedy’s dissent was, to be sure, couched
in terms of notice. But in suggesting that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory grant
conditions categorically cannot give the states adequate notice, Justice Kennedy effectively
argued that Congress, and Congress alone, must make clear a particularized application of a grant
condition. He thus in effect argued for application of the accountability model.
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
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concluded that this generally phrased duty could not bind the state to
provide educational services to students who had been suspended or
expelled for reasons wholly unrelated to their disabilities.94 The court first
concluded that the statutory reference to a “right” to educational services
clearly incorporated a notion that rights may be forfeited. 95 The court then
rejected the United States’s argument that, if the court concluded that the
provision were ambiguous in its application to Virginia’s disciplinary
policy, the court should defer to the Department of Education’s
construction of the provision.96
To be sure, IDEA’s provision is phrased in such general terms that it
could reasonably be read to sweep in any number of specific obligations.
But interpretive problems would not disappear even if Congress had drafted
a more precise statutory condition. Imagine instead a statutory grant
condition that provides: “A state shall be entitled to funds under this
program only on the condition that it provides to disabled students who
have been suspended or expelled educational services comparable to those
provided in the classroom to nondisciplined students.” Although this
provision obviously would have eliminated much of the debate in Riley, it
nevertheless would pose its own problems of construction. First, even if this
provision incorporated IDEA’s definition of children with disabilities,97
questions could arise whether, for example, a student with attention deficit
disorder has a “serious emotional disturbance” within the meaning of the
Act,98 or whether students with temporary disabilities are entitled to the
protected services.99 Second, because the provision does not define
“comparable,” the question inevitably would arise whether, for example,
thrice-weekly yet individualized tutoring is sufficient, or whether providing
noncertified instructors satisfies the obligation. What, then, would the court
do if posed with these questions? The accountability model would appear to
require the court to conclude, even if the Department of Education had
94. Riley, 106 F.3d at 566.
95. Id. at 563. Of course, if the court were correct in this conclusion, then the agency’s
interpretation of the provision categorically to require educational services to “all children with
disabilities” arguably would not be reasonable and thus would fail under Chevron’s step two. But
the court’s interpretation of the word “right” begs the question of who gets to decide, in the first
instance, what the statute requires.
96. Id. at 567.
97. The Act defines “child with a disability” to mean “a child . . . (i) with mental retardation,
hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance[,] . . . orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by
reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3) (West 2000).
98. See id. (defining “child with a disability” to include a child with a “serious emotional
disturbance”).
99. See id. (defining “child with a disability” to include a child with “other health
impairments”); cf. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that the decision
whether an employee’s impairment “substantially limits” one or more major life activities under
ADA is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs).
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regulations that define the ambiguous terms, that the hypothetical statute
cannot obligate the state to provide services not clearly contemplated in the
statute, or to provide services to individuals not clearly covered by the
statute.
It is possible, of course, that, if faced with this hypothetical statute and
one of these hypothetical questions, a court following the accountability
model would conclude that the statute is sufficiently clear to bind the state.
But this statute, although considerably more precise than the actual
provision of IDEA at issue in Riley, contains its own ambiguities; the
difference is one of degree, not of kind. In either case, the state can claim
that Congress has not specified the particular burden sought to be imposed,
and it matters not to the state, the federal government, or the private party
seeking to enforce the obligation that the burden is a product of interpretive
difficulties at a different level of generality. And if Chevron deference is, as
the accountability model holds, inappropriate to define the obligations that
a grant condition imposes on state recipients under a generally ambiguous
statutory condition, then it likewise must be inappropriate to define
obligations imposed by an ambiguous provision of a more tightly drawn
statutory condition. By confining Pennhurst to the question whether a
provision of a statute functions as a condition on the acceptance of funds, as
opposed to a mere expression of congressional aspiration, courts can avoid
the problem of distinguishing between provisions that are particularly
ambiguous and those that are only somewhat so.
Consider, as another example, Title IX’s prohibition on discrimination
“on the basis of sex . . . under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”100 This provision (which the Supreme Court
has made clear satisfies Pennhurst’s notice requirement) leaves many
important questions unanswered. Do facially neutral policies with a
disparate impact on women discriminate against women?101 Does sexual
harassment count as discrimination?102 Is same-sex harassment
discrimination on the basis of sex?103 Does a university’s sex-based firing
of a female employee count as discrimination “under any education
program or activity”?104 Suppose that Congress attempted to address some
of the ambiguities raised by this general prohibition by providing explicitly
that “discrimination” includes teacher-on-student harassment and studenton-student harassment if the school had notice of the harassment. A school
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
101. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (considering whether the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits policies with a disparate impact).
102. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
103. Cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (holding that same-sex
harassment may violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
104. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982).
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district plausibly could still argue that, because of Congress’s silence, mere
constructive notice of harassment cannot render the district liable, or that
any remedial action defeats a suit for damages. And even if Congress
amends the statute to say that “reasonable remedial action shall be a
complete defense to liability under this provision,” a school district can
claim that, because Congress did not specifically define how much remedial
action is adequate, the Department of Education’s interpretation that the
school must discipline the offender cannot bind the state.105
By effectively resolving any textual ambiguity against the federal
government, the accountability model dramatically alters the balances that
Pennhurst and Chevron struck among the competing values described
above. Recall that Pennhurst sought, by promoting transparency in
legislation and increasing the chance that Congress considers the interests
of the states when it imposes burdens on them, to protect state autonomy
and voluntary choice without unduly burdening Congress’s ability to
impose binding obligations on the states.106 Because Congress could never
legislate at the level of specificity required by the accountability model—
and because it is, for reasons discussed above,107 arguably undesirable for
Congress to create such dense statutory schemes—that approach effectively
gives recalcitrant states a trump card against grant conditions that they
deem, notwithstanding their acceptance of conditional federal funds, unduly
burdensome. The accountability model essentially treats state autonomy as
the only end while undermining state accountability and imposing an
impossible burden on Congress. And by thus diminishing Congress’s power
to achieve its goals noncoercively through the spending power, application
of the model makes it less likely that Congress will seek to regulate states in
cooperative federal-state programs, which ultimately are more respectful of
state prerogatives than is direct federal regulation of state conduct. 108
The accountability model likewise upsets Chevron’s accommodation of
competing interests. As discussed above, Chevron balanced the interests in
ensuring that Congress retains legislative supremacy and that the judiciary
retains its role as ultimate arbiter of federal law, on the one hand, with the
interests in promoting expertise in governance and preserving the executive
branch’s discretion in enforcing federal law, on the other.109 The

105. As discussed infra notes 179-196 and accompanying text, the Title IX hypothetical
raises difficult questions about timing and notice to states.
106. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
108. It also is not clear, as a descriptive matter, that the states’ interests are better
accommodated in Congress than by agencies. There are substantial constraints on agencies’ ability
to issue regulations, see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (holding that an agency must justify a regulation by examining data and
articulating a rationale), and states, like private parties, can comment on agencies’ proposed rules.
109. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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accountability model, however, cannot accommodate all of these interests.
Because the model imposes an unrealistic burden of legislative specificity
on Congress, it limits Congress’s power to bind states. Similarly, because
application of the model entitles states to defeat statutory conditions by
claiming ambiguity in particularized applications, the courts’ power to
conduct a traditional inquiry into legislative meaning is diminished. And by
refusing to permit executive interpretations of grant conditions to bind
states, the accountability model limits the ability of agencies to bring their
expertise to bear on problems that they are charged with addressing, and it
curtails the executive’s traditional enforcement discretion. Indeed, under the
accountability model, Congress cannot bind states with any condition that is
susceptible to more than one reasonable reading, regardless of whether the
agency has interpreted the provision. As long as the state could claim that
the statutory condition is ambiguous in its application to the particular
controversy at issue, the state’s own (reasonable) interpretation of the
provision would control. Under the accountability model, agency action
simply is irrelevant; ambiguity—even ambiguity at a high level of
specificity—defeats the federal government’s attempt to impose a burden
on the state as a condition of its receipt of federal funds.
When Congress makes clear its objectives, moreover, it has reason to
expect that its requirements will be applied uniformly. But if a state could
defeat application of a federal requirement simply by pointing out that it is
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then federal law
would cease to apply uniformly. In addition, under the accountability
model, federal requirements could vary not only from state to state, but also
between state and private recipients of federal funds. If the ambiguous
condition were part of a grant program that supplied funds to both state and
private entities, application of the accountability model would result in
conflicting statutory interpretations; the state would not be bound by any
condition, but the private party would be bound by the agency’s
(reasonable) interpretation of the provision. But a statute either imposes (in
light of background principles of statutory interpretation, including clearstatement rules and principles of deference to agency views) a condition or
it does not; the accountability model undermines this uniformity in statutory
meaning.110
110. The Fourth Circuit added another anomaly to the accountability model: that the court
does accord Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous grant conditions when the
interpretation is favorable to the state. As discussed supra note 91, the court in Riley did not
purport to overrule its decisions that hold that when a private party has a dispute with a state about
the proper interpretation of an ambiguously expressed condition in a federal grant program, the
court will apply Chevron if the state agrees with the agency’s interpretation. But Chevron’s
balance of the interests discussed above should not—indeed, by definition does not—turn on the
substance of the agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision, as long as that
interpretation is reasonable. Chevron deference is warranted because (1) executive enforcement
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In light of Garcia, there is, to be sure, value in maintaining the
incentive for Congress to make difficult legislative decisions and not pass
the resolution of controversial questions to the agencies. Indeed, Garcia is
premised on the structural protections for states that inhere in the
representative system in Congress; if Congress punts on policy questions,
then some of those structural protections may be lost. But this argument
suggests only that Congress should be required to make the essential
choice—in the case of conditioned spending, whether to impose a condition
on state recipients. As explained above, it is not feasible for Congress to
legislate with a level of specificity that would preordain the statute’s
application to all conceivable sets of circumstances. Garcia, which
enhanced federal power with respect to the states, should not be read
effectively to eviscerate Congress’s authority to bind states with conditions
on grants of federal funds. Chevron is not inherently in tension with Garcia,
and Garcia itself suggests no limit on the availability of deference to
agency interpretations of conditioned spending programs, even when those
interpretations impose burdens on the states.
The accountability model’s failure to accord Chevron deference to
agency constructions of grant conditions that are ambiguous in their
application to particular circumstances thus defeats the careful balancing of
competing interests that Chevron and Pennhurst represent. Because even
the most attentive and forward-looking Congress could not anticipate every
conceivable set of circumstances that might arise under a grant program, the
accountability model’s categorical rule against Chevron deference imposes
an impossible burden on Congress. The model also ignores the interests,
central to the decision in Chevron, of promoting agency expertise and
executive enforcement discretion. The accountability model is not the only
sensible interpretation of Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule.

necessarily involves a degree of policymaking discretion; (2) Congress often intends to vest such
discretion in agencies; and (3) agencies have expertise in the substantive fields that they regulate.
These justifications for deference are as applicable when the agency’s interpretation imposes a
relatively large burden on the states as when the agency adopts an alternative, equally reasonable
interpretation that is less burdensome.
Similarly, even under the accountability model’s unduly expansive reading of Pennhurst—
which requires Congress unambiguously to define the precise contours of any conditional burden
that it intends to impose on the states—Chevron deference should never apply to agency
interpretations, including those that benefit the state. Because this view imposes on Congress, and
Congress alone, the obligation to define the terms of conditional grants of federal funds, agency
interpretations that in any sense alter the congressionally defined terms would not be binding. In
order to achieve the proper balance among the interests described above, Chevron deference must
apply either to all reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provision or to none. It
cannot, as the Fourth Circuit appears to have concluded, apply only to some subset of reasonable
interpretations defined wholly without reference to the interests that Chevron deference is
designed to serve.
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C. The State Choice Model
In light of this critique of the accountability model, one could conclude
that Pennhurst’s rule is merely a device to distinguish statutory conditions
on the receipt of federal funds from mere hortatory statements of policy by
Congress. Indeed, that distinction was the basic question to be decided in
Pennhurst.111 Subsequent applications of the clear-statement principle,
however, have suggested another theoretical justification for the rule.
The state choice model holds that notice is the linchpin of Pennhurst’s
clear-statement rule. Recall that in Pennhurst, the Court analogized
Spending Clause legislation to contractual agreements between the federal
government and the states; “in return for federal funds, the States agree to
comply with federally imposed conditions.”112 Under this view, as with any
contract, the “legitimacy” of the offer (in other words, the “legitimacy of
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power”113) turns on
whether the grantee (that is, the state) “voluntarily and knowingly accepts
the terms of the ‘contract.’”114 And “[t]here can, of course, be no knowing
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain
what is expected of it.”115
As a preliminary matter, there is room for debate over whether, in light
of the vast financial resources of the federal government, states truly may
voluntarily acquiesce in stringent conditions on grants of federal funds;116
indeed, a number of commentators have contended that conditioned grants
are inherently coercive because the states have no realistic choice but to
accept. Professor Lynn Baker, for example, has argued that because the
“federal government has a monopoly power over the various sources of
state revenue,”117 states (at least, that is, states that would not, if given a
completely free choice, accept the conditions attached) must acquiesce to
the federal conditions in order to secure a “return” of the state’s own

111. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1981).
112. Id. at 17.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Compare South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress’ notion of the general welfare, the
reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause
gives ‘power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to
become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are selfimposed.’”), and Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 1135 (“[T]he dependence of the states or local
government upon federal funds may have become so great as to destroy the possibility of an
effective choice.”), with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (“If Congress enact[s
a statute] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states] to yield, that purpose may be
effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.”).
117. Baker, supra note 11, at 1935.
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money.118 This argument, however, tends to undervalue the decisions of the
national polity119 and would diminish Congress’s ability to accomplish
national goals through cooperative federal-state programs that allow states
to continue to exercise a large degree of control over matters of local
importance.120 In addition, to suggest that states need judicial protection
because they risk having their wills overborne by federal coercion unduly
anthropomorphizes states; although there is reason to protect individuals’
decisionmaking from the coercive power of the state,121 states are not
people, with dignity and the capacity for sentience, and thus arguably
should not be treated as such.122 More fundamentally, one might dispute
118. Id. at 1937; see also id. at 1973-74 (discussing coercion). In Professor Baker’s words:
A conditional offer of federal funds to the states implicitly divides them into two
groups: (1) states that already comply, or without financial inducement would happily
comply, with the funding condition(s), and for which the offer of federal money
therefore poses no real choice; and, (2) states that find the funding condition(s)
unattractive and therefore face the choice of foregoing the federal funds in order to
avoid complying with the condition(s), or submitting to undesirable federal regulation
in order to receive the offered funds.
When the federal government makes a conditional offer of funds, states in the
second group are severely constrained in their decisionmaking by the lack of
equivalent, alternative sources of revenue.
Id. at 1935-36. In effect, in Professor Baker’s view, a minority of states are likely to be forced to
cede to the will of the majority of states. As a result, she proposes that courts presume invalid any
conditional offer of federal funds to the states that would, if accepted, regulate the states in ways
that Congress could not directly mandate; the presumption would be rebutted if the spending
simply states the purpose for which the states should spend the funds and “reimburses,” in whole
or in part, expenditures for that purpose. Id. at 1962-63.
119. Indeed, the fundamental flaw in Professor Baker’s argument is that it is, at bottom,
antimajoritarian. The argument ignores the fact that in any representative democracy—including
the United States (in contrast to the individual states of the Union)—the will of the minority (here,
the states that have a majority of citizens who disagree with federal policy) must be, absent some
independent antimajoritarian limitation (such as the First Amendment), subordinate to the will of
the majority. Indeed, Professor Baker’s argument would logically extend to preventing Congress
from enacting laws clearly within its affirmative powers to which the people of a minority of
states object. Yet it cannot be that, for example, federal gun-control legislation is invalid merely
because the citizens of New Hampshire and Texas object.
120. When Congress acts pursuant to its spending powers, it gives the states a choice to
maintain primary control over most matters of governance within the scope of the grant, with the
obvious exception that the states are bound by the federal conditions (with which they might not,
in the absence of federal action, have independently complied).
121. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits
of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988); Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and
Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
122. Compare Baker, supra note 11, at 1938 (comparing the plight of states that are
dependent on the federal government for funds to welfare recipients), and Rosenthal, supra note
68, at 1135 (rejecting the contention that “the notion of duress, as imposed upon a governmental
unit, is . . . an inappropriate one because it is an ‘anthropomorphism’ that is not conducive to
logical analysis”), with Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254
(1977) (“Debating whether conditions on federal grants . . . ‘coerce’ the states is an unhelpful
anthropomorphism.”). See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feely, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 912 (1994) (outlining competing positions).
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whether Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule is essential to ensure that states
can ascertain their obligations under federal law. States (or, more precisely,
their policymakers and legal counsel) not only are familiar with traditional
canons of statutory construction, but also are, for obvious reasons, more
likely than ordinary citizens to be aware of requirements imposed by law.
Nevertheless, at bottom, the contract analogy suggests a desire to
protect state voluntary choice and underscores the importance of notice to
the states of the conditions sought to be imposed. Under this view, states
can decide whether acceptance of an offer of federal funds is in their
interests only if they have a full understanding of the burdens that
acceptance will impose on them. Notions of elemental fairness require that
the states be informed fully of the obligations that they will assume in
accepting the funds. This is the basis of the state choice model.
As long as certain background norms of administrative interpretation—
such as Chevron’s rule of deference—are set in advance, a state can
“ascertain what is expected of it” from sources other than the plain statutory
text. The state choice model thus does not focus on which federal
actor—Congress or the administrative agency—imposed a burdensome
condition on the state, but rather inquires whether some federal
pronouncement is sufficiently clear to apprise the state of the obligation that
it will undertake in accepting federal funds. Under the state choice model,
Congress satisfies its burden under Pennhurst simply by making clear that
it is attaching a condition, but it need not, as would be the case under the
accountability model approach, “specifically identify and proscribe in
advance every conceivable state action that would be improper.”123
Reasonable agency interpretations of statutory conditions accordingly may
bind state recipients of federal funds—at least, as I discuss in detail below
in Part III, when the agency interpretation was available when the state
accepted federal funds.
This has been the Supreme Court’s consistent understanding of
Pennhurst.124 In Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education,125 for
123. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 495 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of
Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 666-69 (1985)), cert. granted sub nom. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28
(2000).
124. Cases decided before Pennhurst, moreover, consistently held that reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutory grant conditions could bind state recipients of federal
funds. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (construing the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6701, and stating that the Court has “repeatedly upheld”
Congress’s use of “the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt
of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with statutory and administrative directives”
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 592
(1983) (stating that the basic framework for deference to administrative interpretations of
ambiguous statutory provisions applies in federal-state grant programs); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974) (relying on Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) regulations in
construing Title VI’s general proscription on discrimination to include policies with a disparate
impact); id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring) (applying pre-Chevron deference to administrative
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example, the Court made clear that Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule is
designed to determine only if Congress has imposed some condition, and
that “Pennhurst does not suggest that the Federal Government may recover
misused federal funds only if every improper expenditure has been
specifically identified and proscribed in advance.”126 The Court did “not
believe that ambiguities in the requirements should invariably be resolved
against the Federal Government as the drafter of the grant agreement.”127
The Court has followed this approach both in cases considering
numerous other federal-state grant programs 128 and in cases construing the
interpretations); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970) (deferring to HEW’s interpretation
of the statutory provision governing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334-35 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring) (deferring to HEW’s
interpretation of the statutory provision governing the AFDC program); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-46 (1947) (construing the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 61l, which
prohibited employees of state agencies whose work was funded in part by federal grants from
actively participating in “political management or the political campaigns” and deferring to the
interpretation of the U.S. Civil Service Commission that defined service on a political committee
as a forbidden activity under the Act).
125. 470 U.S. 656.
126. Id. at 666.
127. Id. at 669. The Court in Bennett judged the validity of an effort by the Secretary of
Education to recover from Kentucky funds granted under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 2701, which provides federal grants to support state and local
education programs for disadvantaged children. In 1970, Congress amended the Act to require
that Title I funds be used to “supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds”
that states and localities expend for the education of indigent children. Id. at 660 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 241e(a)(3)(B) (1970)). Shortly after Congress enacted the 1970 amendments, the Department of
Education promulgated regulations that prohibited states from using Title I funds to “supplant”
their own contributions for the education of disadvantaged children. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R.
§ 116.17(h) (1974)). After a federal audit concluded that Kentucky had used Title I funds to
defray substantially all the costs of educating disadvantaged students in one of the state’s
programs, the Secretary demanded repayment of Title I funds. Bennett, 470 U.S. at 660-61.
Relying on Pennhurst, the state argued (and the court of appeals agreed) that the state did not
accept Title I funds “with ‘knowing acceptance’ of the condition the Secretary now seeks to
impose.” Id. at 662 (quoting Kentucky v. Sec’y of Educ., 717 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1983)).
The Court did not explicitly apply Chevron deference to the agency regulations at issue in
Bennett. The Court’s ultimate conclusion—that Kentucky “clearly violated existing statutory and
regulatory provisions that prohibited supplanting,” id. at 670, and that “[b]oth the statutory
provision and the implementing regulations expressly required that Title I funds not be used to
supplant state and local funds for the pupils participating in Title I programs,” id. at 671—seemed
to turn as much on Chevron step one as on Chevron step two. Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that Congress cannot be expected explicitly to anticipate every possible contingency and that, as a
result, agencies often will be required to interpret the scope of the conditions that Congress
imposes. Id. at 669. In addition, the Court implicitly recognized that the Department of
Education’s interpretation of the condition at issue was reasonable. Id. at 669-73. Finally, the
Court clearly held that the Secretary correctly sought repayment of federal funds used in fiscal
year 1974 because Kentucky had violated “then-existing requirements”—including requirements
imposed by regulations that elaborated on the condition-creating statute. Id. at 673. At the very
least, then, after the Court’s decision in Bennett, a reasonable agency interpretation that is in effect
when the state accepts the funds in question can bind the state, notwithstanding Pennhurst’s clearstatement rule.
128. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427,
431 (1987) (holding that Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations
implementing the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970),
created rights enforceable by tenants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; applying Chevron deference; and
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obligations imposed by general grant conditions that are unlinked to any
particular grant of federal funds, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,129 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,130 and Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972.131 These provisions are not themselves
grant-providing, but rather are background conditions on the receipt of
federal financial assistance distributed through other affirmative grant
programs; Title VI’s and section 504’s antidiscrimination norms apply to
“any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 132 and
Title IX’s applies to “any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”133 In the Title IX context, for example, the Court has
consistently followed the state choice model and concluded that agency
regulations interpreting the Act’s ban on sex discrimination can, without
running afoul of Pennhurst, give state recipients of federal funds notice of
the conditions with which they must comply.134
rejecting the respondent’s Pennhurst argument); Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist.
No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 262, 269-70 (1985) (deferring to the Department of the Interior’s
interpretation of the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, 31 U.S.C. § 6901, and rejecting the state’s
federalism-based claims, concluding that the statute was sufficiently clear to impose the condition
at issue). In Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), the Court concluded that the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679(a) (1988), does not
confer rights enforceable under § 1983, because the regulations implementing the Act “are not
specific and do not provide notice to the States that failure to do anything other than submit a plan
with the requisite features, to be approved by the Secretary, is a further condition on the receipt of
funds from the Federal Government.” 503 U.S. at 362. The Court’s inquiry, however, was
consistent with the state choice model, because the Court considered whether agency regulations
interpreting the statutory condition—as opposed to the statutory text itself—are sufficiently
specific and clear to give notice to the states that failure to comply subjects them to private suits
for enforcement. See also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 335 (1997) (holding that Title IVD of the Social Security Act does not give individuals a federal right to sue states to enforce
conditions).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
132. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 2000) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
134. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (considering
student-on-student sexual harassment and stating that “the regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX
has long provided funding recipients with notice that they may be liable for their failure to
respond to the discriminatory acts of certain non-agents”); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,
524 U.S. 274, 288, 292-93 (1998) (considering teacher-on-student sexual harassment and relying
on Department of Education regulations); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12
(1982) (holding that Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in employment relationships in
educational programs and recognizing a framework of deference); cf. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273, 279, 286 n.15 (1987) (relying in part on Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations in
defining “handicapped individual” within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
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Although the Court has had numerous opportunities to change course, it
has not done so. Indeed, even those members of the Court (other than
Justice Kennedy) who have expressed particular concern about the
imposition of unanticipated burdens on state recipients of federal funds
have appeared reluctant to adopt the accountability model and thus suggest
that agency interpretations of statutorily created conditions can never be
accorded Chevron deference. Justice Thomas, for example, recently argued
(in dissent) that, in light of Pennhurst, “the constitutionally mandated
rules of construction applicable to legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress’ spending power” require the Court to interpret narrowly not
only congressionally imposed conditions, but also reasonable agency
constructions of those conditions.135 He did not argue, however, that
Pennhurst’s insistence on congressional clarity categorically forbids the
application of Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutorily
imposed conditions. Instead, he proposed a modified version of the state
choice model that would apply a super-clarity rule to agency regulations
that interpret statutory grant conditions. Chief Justice Rehnquist also has
argued for a heightened standard of clarity for agency interpretations of
statutory grant conditions, but, like Justice Thomas, has done so applying
what I term the state choice model.136
Notably, the Court has also deferred to agency interpretations of Title IX in cases that
involved private (that is, nonstate) recipients of federal funds. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555, 569, 575 (1984) (crediting the Department of Education’s interpretation of the
statutory phrase “receiving Federal financial assistance” and holding that the Department of
Education “may properly condition federal financial assistance on the recipient’s assurance that it
will conduct the aided program or activity in accordance with Title IX and the applicable
regulations”); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 (1979) (referring to the Department
of HEW’s view that a private remedy to enforce Title IX will further the statute’s purposes). The
same is true in the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI contexts. See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1984) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act entitles a private employee to
bring suit even if federal aid received by the employer was not primarily intended to promote
employment, and deferring to HEW’s regulations because HEW was “the agency responsible for
implementing [the] congressional enactment”); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S.
582 (1983) (deferring to an agency interpretation of the intent standard under Title VI). Indeed,
the Court often has applied Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory
conditions on federal grants in cases involving private grant recipients. See, e.g., Regions Hosp. v.
Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998) (Medicare); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (Title X of the
Public Health Service Act). If the Court had applied the accountability model, however, then
presumably the Court would have been willing to defer only in cases involving private recipients,
thus creating conflicting standards depending on the public status of the grant recipient.
135. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 79, 85 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In Garret F., the Court held that IDEA “requires a public school district in a
participating State to provide a ventilator-dependent student with certain nursing services during
school hours.” Id. at 68-69, 79.
136. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 291-92 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In Arline, the Court
considered whether a person with a contagious disease can be considered a “handicapped
individual” within the meaning of the Act. In concluding that a person with such a disease is
protected by the Act, the Court found HHS’s regulations, which defined the relevant statutory
term, to be “of significant assistance.” Id. at 279. The Court distinguished Pennhurst, which
considered a statutory provision that merely expressed a “congressional preference,” because “our
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Notwithstanding its defects, the accountability model does suggest the
primary criticism of the state choice model: The Court’s refusal in Garcia
to impose substantive limits on Congress’s authority to regulate the states
was premised largely on the structural protections for states inherent
in the federal legislative process,137 and (although it predated Garcia)
Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule, in requiring Congress expressly to
consider the burdens that it imposes on states, provides some assurance that
those structural protections function effectively. Allowing agencies in effect
to impose conditions on the states’ receipt of federal funds risks
undermining these protections, and creates the potential that agencies will
impose conditions that were not within Congress’s contemplation.
Although the state choice model promotes a number of interests that
fall, generally speaking, on the federal government’s side of the federalstate balance, it is not unduly weighted in favor of the federal government.
By making notice the determinative factor, the state choice model echoes
the intuitive appeal of the Pennhurst clear-statement rule: It is unfair, when
offering states money that they arguably have little realistic choice but to
accept,138 to saddle them with obligations that they did not—and could
not—anticipate. In this sense, the state choice model incorporates the notion
that underlies the doctrine of qualified immunity for governmental officials.
“[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on
the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action, assessed in light of the
legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time it was taken.” 139 This
standard seeks to avoid “the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad
faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal
obligations of his position,” to take certain actions.140 Similarly, the state
choice model holds that a state can be held to a condition—and thus subject
to whatever liabilities flow from violation of the condition, such as damages
in suits by aggrieved private parties or withholding of funds by the federal
government—only if it was clear, at the time that the state accepted funds,
that the condition was part of the bargain. And, as is discussed in detail
below, under the state choice model, as under qualified immunity doctrine,
holding is premised on the plain language of the Act, and on the detailed regulations that
implement it.” Id. at 286 n.15 (emphasis added) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority
had ignored Pennhurst. He based his argument, however, on the fact that “the language of the Act,
regulations, and legislative history are silent on this issue.” Id. at 291-92 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). He therefore seemed to concede that explicit regulations could, in a
different case, provide states with notice of ambiguous grant conditions.
137. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985).
138. See supra notes 70, 117-120 and accompanying text.
139. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982)).
140. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
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a state cannot be bound by a condition effectively imposed by an agency
after the state accepted funds, if the state’s own interpretation of the
statutory condition is reasonable.
To be sure, qualified immunity doctrine exists mainly to encourage
governmental decisionmaking and because it is unfair to hold a government
employee liable in his individual capacity for reasonable actions taken in
service of his employer,141 goals that are largely irrelevant in the federalstate grant context. The analogy nevertheless is useful, because it highlights
how the state choice model effectively limits the states’ trump of federal
obligations to those circumstances where the states are most likely to be
victims of unfairness. Those circumstances arise when an agency issues,
after the state accepts funds, an interpretation that conflicts with the state’s
own reasonable interpretation, on which the state has relied in planning its
affairs. Under the state choice model, the validity of grant conditions turns
not on which federal actor precisely defines the terms of the contract—
Congress or the agency charged with enforcing the program—but rather on
whether the terms are clear ex ante. A state that accepts funds after an
agency has reasonably construed the grant program to require certain action
by the state thus should be considered bound by the agency’s interpretation,
because in such a case the state cannot be said to be “unaware of the
conditions” or “unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”142 Conversely,
under the state choice model, a state would not be bound by an
interpretation that the agency issues after the state accepts funds, regardless
of the interpretation’s reasonableness. Indeed, notice must be judged with
reference to the time that the state enters the “contract”143—that is, when
the state accepts the federal funds.
The state choice model therefore provides a useful way to consider the
more difficult question with which the Court has not yet grappled: whether
regulations issued after the state accepts funds nevertheless can impose a
burden of compliance on the state. As I explain below, that question is a
close one, and it merits consideration of alternative models of analysis.
III. THE QUESTION OF RETROACTIVITY
Because the accountability model categorically denies deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory grant conditions, that model a
fortiori would deny deference in the most difficult case for Chevron
deference—namely, the case in which the agency issues the contested
interpretation of the grant condition after the state accepts the federal funds.

141. See id.
142. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
143. Id.
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As suggested above, moreover, although the state choice model generally
accords Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous grant
conditions, the model precludes a court from binding a state recipient of
federal funds to an agency’s interpretation of a grant condition if the agency
announced its view after the state has accepted funds. Therefore, although
the competing models differ dramatically in their application to agency
interpretations issued before the state accepts funds, they produce the same
result when applied to retroactive agency interpretations. I now turn to the
question whether categorically denying deference to this class of agency
interpretations is, as a normative matter, a sensible limitation of federal
power. Wholly aside from the competing models of Pennhurst’s clearstatement rule that I have been discussing, should administrative agencies
be able to hold states to interpretations of statutory conditions announced
after the state has accepted funds under the relevant program?
By way of introduction, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court has
never squarely addressed whether agency interpretations issued after the
state receives funds can bind the state, although in dicta the Court has
suggested, in applying the state choice model, that such agency
interpretations cannot. In Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education,144
the United States contended that state recipients of Title I funds should be
held bound by “any reasonable interpretation [by the Department of
Education] of the requirements of Title I”145—that is, any interpretation,
whenever issued, that would satisfy Chevron review. In Bennett, the agency
had published its interpretation of Title I before the state had accepted the
funds in question, and the state had agreed to comply with “the legal
requirements in place when the grants were made.”146 As a result, the Court
had
no occasion . . . to address the circumstances, if any, in which the
Secretary could impose liability for expenditures made in reliance
upon an earlier interpretation provided by the Department, or to
decide if a State may be held liable where its interpretation of an
ambiguous requirement is more reasonable than an interpretation
advanced by the Secretary after the grants were made.147

144. 470 U.S. 656 (1985).
145. Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citation omitted). On the same day that it decided Bennett v. Kentucky Department
of Education, the Court held, in Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639-46 (1985), that a 1978
congressional amendment to Title I that increased the states’ flexibility to use Title I funds did not
govern the Department of Education’s audit of New Jersey’s misuse of funds granted for 19701972. Citing Pennhurst, the Court reasoned that “New Jersey, when it applied for and received
Title I funds for the years 1970-1972, had no basis to believe that the propriety of the expenditures
would be judged by any standards other than the ones in effect at the time.” Id. at 640. The Court
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The Court, however, was “reluctant to conclude that the States guaranteed
that their performance under the grant agreements would satisfy whatever
interpretation of the terms might later be adopted by the Secretary, so long
as that interpretation is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
Title I.’”148
It is also worth noting, as a preliminary matter, that it is possible to
apply what I have called the state choice model and still conclude that a
state recipient of federal funds is bound by an agency interpretation of a
statutory condition issued after the state accepted funds. The state choice
model turns, as I have explained, on notice to the state recipient of the
relevant federal obligation. With Chevron as a background principle of

noted that “[r]etroactive application of changes in the substantive requirements of a federal grant
program would deny both federal auditors and grant recipients fixed, predictable standards for
determining if expenditures are proper.” Id. The Court did not hold, however, that subsequent
legislative enactments categorically cannot apply to prior federal grants; instead, it held that
“absent a clear indication to the contrary in the relevant statutes or legislative history, changes in
the substantive standards governing federal grant programs do not alter obligations and liabilities
arising under earlier grants.” Id. at 641. Because the Court concluded that Congress intended the
1978 amendments to apply only prospectively, it held that New Jersey could not rely on them to
exonerate its use of funds under an earlier grant.
148. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. at 670 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The Fifth Circuit has held that an agency’s interpretation
cannot retroactively bind a state. In Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District, 106 F.3d
648 (5th Cir. 1997), the court addressed whether Title IX creates liability for a school district that
negligently fails to prevent a teacher from sexually harassing a student. The court held that Title
IX imposes liability only if the school district had actual knowledge that there was a substantial
risk that sexual abuse would occur. In so concluding, the court relied on the fact that Congress
enacted Title IX under the Spending Clause, and thus that there should be no liability “unless the
recipient of the federal funds agreed to assume the liability.” Id. at 654. The court noted that
applicable agency regulations “fail to indicate any expectation that school districts will be
vicariously liable under Title IX.” Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1996)). The court recognized
that the Department of Education had recently issued proposed Title IX guidelines that purported
to impose liability when the school has constructive notice of the harassment and fails to remedy
the problem, id. at 658 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 52,173 (Oct. 4, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 42,728 (Aug. 16,
1996)), and acknowledged that “when interpreting [T]itle IX we accord the [agency’s]
interpretations appreciable deference.” Id. (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d
1006, 1015 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996)). The court refused, however, to “apply these guidelines
retroactively.” Although “the government can add strings to the Title IX funds as it disburses
them,” it “cannot modify past agreements with recipients by unilaterally issuing guidelines
through the Department of Education.” Id. The court thus declined to apply the guidelines in Rosa
H. and made “no comment on how these guidelines might affect cases in which a school district
accepts Title IX funds after the guidelines’ promulgation date.” Id.
As discussed infra notes 179-193 and accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit misapprehended
the nature of Title IX. Although Title IX plainly imposes a duty on state recipients of federal
funds to refrain from discrimination on the basis of sex “under any education program or
activity,” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), it is not itself a grant-providing statute. Like Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), Title IX serves as a background condition on the receipt of federal
financial assistance distributed through other affirmative grant programs. There is no such thing as
“Title IX funds.” As I explain below, application of the state choice model creates temporal
problems when the issue is the applicability of an obligation imposed by a regulation interpreting
such a background condition: In such cases, how should a court determine when the state—which
likely receives funds regularly under many federal grant programs—accepted funds?
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interpretation, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a state
recipient should be held to have received constructive notice that it would
be bound by any subsequent reasonable agency interpretation of the statute.
And even if one finds such a rule unduly harsh—especially in light of the
fact that Chevron deference is applicable even to agency interpretations that
wholly reverse prior agency interpretations,149 thus creating the possibility
that a state could be bound by an agency interpretation of a statutory grant
condition that is the opposite of the agency interpretation in effect when the
state accepted funds150—one could view the state as having received
adequate notice of its obligations if Congress specified in the statute itself
that state recipients would be bound, for example, by any subsequent
reasonable agency interpretation, whenever issued.151 Although it is
perfectly reasonable to consider such a congressional statement as ratifying
any subsequent agency interpretation—even one issued after the state has
received funds—it only begs the question whether Congress should be
permitted to delegate to an agency the authority retroactively to bind the
state.152 I proceed here under the assumption that faithful application
of the state choice model precludes deference to retroactive agency
interpretations.
Another way to conceptualize the question of “retroactive” agency
interpretations of grant conditions is to ask whose interpretation of
ambiguous grant conditions controls. As I discuss below, there are three
actors whose interpretation could prevail: the state, the agency, or a court.
Denying Chevron deference (that is, the result obtained, by definition, by
applying the state choice model, or, for that matter, the accountability
model) essentially entitles the state to interpret the condition, as long as its
interpretation is reasonable (and thus arguably consistent with the statute).
Conversely, a decision to privilege Chevron’s values by deferring even to
“retroactive” agency interpretations entitles the agency to bind the state
with any reasonable interpretation, regardless of the reasonableness of the
state’s own interpretation. Finally, the middle ground would be to allow a
court to discern, as it would do outside of the administrative law context,

149. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
150. See Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. at 670.
151. Cf. Pennsylvania v. United States, 781 F.2d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Chevron
deference to uphold a regulation that held states strictly liable for erroneous issuances of benefits
under the Food Stamp Program, and rejecting the state’s Pennhurst argument because “[s]urely
states are familiar with the broad discretion Congress accords to agencies that administer and
resolve the ambiguities in complex social welfare programs”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker,
721 F.2d 170, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding HHS regulations imposing community service
obligations on hospitals).
152. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 79, at 336-37 (considering whether Congress has the power
explicitly to delegate to an agency authority to address a subject governed by a “nondelegation
canon”).

SMITHFINAL.DOC

2001]

APRIL 12, 2001 4/12/01 12:27 PM

Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power

1225

Congress’s intent with respect to the particular circumstances at issue;
this approach thus would deny Chevron deference to the agency’s
interpretation, but it would not automatically credit the state’s interpretation
merely because it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Below, I critique these approaches to agency interpretations of
ambiguous grant conditions—and suggest two variations on letting the
court decide whether the state should be bound—paying particular attention
to how each furthers (or impairs) the values served by Chevron and
Pennhurst. There are, as I explain, defects in each approach, and the
question is close; my inclination is that, notwithstanding some significant
problems, courts should not bind states to agency interpretations issued
after the state accepted funds. Before I address the competing approaches,
however, I discuss notions of retroactivity and attempt to define the class of
cases with which I am concerned here.
A. Notions of Retroactivity
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,153 the Court announced
that because “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law . . . . a statutory grant
[to an agency] of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general
matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive
rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.”154 As
the Court explained in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,155 a presumption
against retroactivity is “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence” because
“[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have
an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.”156 Bowen
thus requires Congress to indicate clearly when it intends to permit agencies
to issue regulations—whether interpretations of statutory provisions
enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending power or any of its other
affirmative sources of authority—that apply to conduct that predates
promulgation of the regulations. Bowen’s fairness rationale is no less
compelling when the entity regulated is a state actor.
In discussing whether Chevron deference should apply without regard
to when the agency issued its interpretation, I do not purport to question the
applicability of Bowen’s presumption against retroactivity. The discussion
that follows, therefore, does not focus on interpretations that an agency
issues after the state engages in the conduct that gave rise to the judicial
controversy. In such cases, the agency interpretation cannot bind the state
153.
154.
155.
156.

488 U.S. 204 (1988).
Id. at 208.
511 U.S. 244 (1994).
Id. at 265.
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recipient of federal funds, at least absent a clear congressional statement
that agency regulations can apply retroactively. To the contrary, Bowen’s
presumption against retroactivity would continue to apply.
As the Supreme Court correctly observed in Bennett, however, the
important event for purposes of Pennhurst—at least under the state choice
model—is the grant of federal funds to the state, not the “conduct” that
gave rise to the dispute.157 That conduct, of course, is not irrelevant; Bowen
would prevent application of the challenged regulation to state conduct that
predated its issuance regardless of when the grants were made. But once
Bowen is accepted as a background rule for retroactive application of
agency regulations, the relevant question, for purposes of Pennhurst, is
whether the state received, at the time that it accepted the funds, adequate
notice of the conditions that would bind it.
Accordingly, it is important (especially for purposes of this Essay) to
distinguish between two different notions of retroactivity. The first type of
retroactivity arises when the government seeks to apply an agency’s
standard-creating interpretation of a federal statute to state conduct that
occurred before the agency issued its interpretation. These cases raise
questions of what I call Bowen retroactivity. The most obvious such cases
are ones in which a party adverse to the state seeks to judge a particular
state actor’s conduct by a standard announced by an agency after that
conduct took place—for example, a suit claiming that a teacher’s
harassment of a student subjects the school district to liability under a
standard announced by the Department of Education after the harassment
allegedly took place.158 The second type of retroactivity is implicated when
an agency issues an interpretation of a statutory grant condition after a state
has accepted funds under the program. These cases do not turn on the
timing of any state actor’s conduct, but rather turn solely on when the state
accepted funds and thus what conditions the state had notice of when it
entered its “contract” with the federal government. These cases raise
questions of what I call Bennett retroactivity.
Not every case of Bennett retroactivity—that is, every case that
addresses the validity of an agency’s post-funds-transfer interpretation of a
grant condition—presents a Bowen problem. To understand the difference
between these two types of retroactivity, consider the various circumstances
under which a judicial controversy over the validity of such an agency
interpretation can arise. First, as in Riley and Bennett, a state may bring suit

157. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985) (“[T]he State agreed to comply
with, and its liability is determined by, the legal requirements that were in place when the grants
were made.”).
158. E.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 647-50 (1999) (noting that
certain agency guidelines “were promulgated too late to contribute to the Board’s notice of
proscribed misconduct”).
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challenging the agency’s interpretation after the agency attempts to
withhold funds or take some other punitive measure.159 Such a suit could
be for review of a decision made in proceedings before the agency, or could
be a direct judicial challenge to the agency’s regulations or decision.
Second, the question of the validity of an agency interpretation could arise
in a suit by the federal government against a state grant recipient to obtain a
refund of misused federal funds. In such a case, the federal government
would rely on regulations to demonstrate the state’s misuse of funds, and
the state would claim that the regulations cannot bind it. Third, a court
could be confronted with the validity of an agency’s interpretation of a
statutory grant condition when, as in Arline,160 Tatro,161 and Rosa H.,162 a
private party sues a state for engaging in conduct that harms the plaintiff
and that is inconsistent with or violates the agency’s interpretation. In these
cases, the private plaintiff claims that the regulations give rise to rights
enforceable against the state.163
In the second and third categories of cases, Bowen’s presumption
against retroactivity at times would render inappropriate Chevron deference
to the agency’s interpretation—indeed, would preclude application of the
agency’s interpretation at all. In the second category—cases in which the
federal government sues to recover “misused” funds—a Bowen problem
would arise if the government’s claim of misuse is based on a regulation
defining the appropriate use of funds that the agency issued after the state
used the funds in question. In such a case, the agency interpretation itself
would define appropriate state conduct—that is, how the funds may be
spent—and thus would apply to conduct that predated its issuance.164
159. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. at 661-62; Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632,
637 (1985); Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 777 (1983); Va. Dep’t. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d
559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997).
160. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
161. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 886 (1984).
162. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 651 (5th Cir. 1997).
163. A private plaintiff’s suit against a state can also involve a reversal of arguments—the
plaintiff claims that the state acted inconsistently with some reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory grant condition, and the state argues that deference is appropriate for the
agency’s interpretation, which favors the state’s position. Rehab. Ass’n v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d
1444, 1448-50 (4th Cir. 1994).
164. Take the example suggested earlier of the federal grant program that requires states to
“assure that all public school students have reasonably individualized access to technology
education.” Imagine that the state receives its appropriation at a time when the Department of
Education has not yet offered its view of the condition, and chooses to exhaust the funds by
purchasing enough computers to ensure a five-to-one student-to-computer ratio. Imagine further
that after the state spends the money, the Department of Education issues a regulation that
interprets the condition to require the funds to be spent on salaries for teachers so that the state can
maintain a ratio of one science teacher for every ten students. There is little doubt that the state’s
interpretation of the condition is reasonable, and to bind the state to the agency’s (equally
reasonable) interpretation could work a financial hardship on the state, which has already spent
the federal funds. Although the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, Bowen prevents it from
binding the state, because the regulation governs the appropriate use of the funds. In contrast, no
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Similarly, in the third category—cases in which a private party sues a
state for engaging in conduct that violates an agency’s interpretation of a
grant condition—a Bowen problem would arise if the agency issued its
interpretation after the conduct took place. For example, suppose that the
Court had not yet decided Davis or Gebser, and thus that it was not clear
whether teacher-on-student sexual harassment could render a school district
liable under Title IX. For purposes of this hypothetical, moreover, imagine
that Title IX is in fact a grant program, and not simply a background
condition on other grant programs. Suppose further that after a public
school teacher harasses a student and the district, despite knowledge of the
problem, fails to take remedial action, the Department of Education issues
an interpretation of Title IX’s antidiscrimination norm that holds the district
liable when it fails to remedy teacher-on-student harassment of which it had
notice. Bowen would prevent the student from establishing the district’s
liability by relying on the agency interpretation. Conversely, no Bowen
problem would arise if the agency issued its regulation after the state
accepted funds under the program, but before the harassment and failure to
cure occurred. Instead, that situation would involve Bennett retroactivity.
In contrast to the second and third categories, in the first category of
cases—that is, those that involve a state’s direct challenge to the validity of
an agency’s interpretation—there typically is no state “conduct” that could
give rise to a Bowen problem. The question in such cases, instead, is simply
whose interpretation of the statutory grant condition is binding on the
parties: the agency’s reasonable interpretation, or the state’s alternative (and
perhaps equally) reasonable interpretation.165 And the answer to that
question does not turn on whether any action by the state should be judged
according to standards not in existence when the action took place, but
rather turns solely on whether Bennett retroactivity creates a problem
worthy of judicial correction—that is, whether a state should be bound by
an agency interpretation that the state did not specifically contemplate when
it accepted conditional federal funds. To be sure, in these cases, the state
often has made some decisions—such as budgetary or other planning
decisions—in reliance on its own reasonable interpretation of the statutory
condition. Thus, for example, if in Riley the Department of Education had

Bowen problem would arise if the regulation were not in place when the state accepted the funds,
but was by the time that the state decided to spend the funds. In that case, the state would have a
claim not of Bowen retroactivity, but of Bennett retroactivity.
165. There is, as I discuss infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text, a third possible
interpretation—that of a court, which could simply attempt to determine what the “parties”
intended at the time that they entered the “contract.” Under this approach, the court would not
accord Chevron deference but would not automatically resolve the dispute in favor of the state.
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not announced its interpretation of IDEA until after the grant of funds,166
Virginia might have elected to spend more money on disabled students’
tutoring services, believing that it had no obligation to spend funds on
educational services for students disciplined for reasons unrelated to their
disabilities. If the agency had then issued its interpretation, the state could
reasonably have contended that, in light of its fiscal decisions in reliance on
its own interpretation of the provision, application of the agency’s view
would “retroactively” burden the state. Such a burden, however, is no
different than that borne by any contracting party who learns only later—in
a judicial action to interpret the contract—that its interpretation of the
contract in fact is not binding.167
For purposes of this Essay, I accept as a background norm Bowen’s
presumption against retroactive application of agency regulations. I focus
instead on the appropriate treatment of agency interpretations that raise
questions of Bennett retroactivity. Indeed, these two different types of
retroactivity raise different concerns. Bowen’s presumption is premised on
considerations of elemental fairness. It simply is not equitable to judge the
conduct of an actor—public or private—by standards not in effect when the
conduct took place. But when an agency has issued its interpretation before
the state engages in the challenged conduct—even if the agency issues the
interpretation after the state has accepted the funds—the same fairness
concerns are not present. Of course, in such a case, the state has another
claim—that it had no notice of the interpretation when it accepted the
funds, and that it might not have accepted the funds had it known of the
interpretation at that time. But that question turns, as do most contract
disputes, on a notion of reasonableness and forseeability, measured at the
time that the parties entered the contract—here, when the state accepted the
conditioned funds. And, as I explain below, in the contract context a party
often finds itself, notwithstanding its own reasonable interpretation, bound
by a contractual condition that is ambiguous in its application to particular
circumstances not contemplated by the parties at the time that they entered
the contract. I turn below to the contract analogy to shed light on whether
courts should refuse to accord Chevron deference to agency interpretations
that suffer from Bennett retroactivity. Before discussing the contract

166. As noted above, however, Riley did not present such a case. Instead, the agency had
announced its interpretation three years before the state implemented its disciplinary policy.
Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1994).
167. Of course, if the state carries out its policy—by, for example, denying a tutor to a
disciplined disabled student—the student denied services might, in reliance on the agency
interpretation, challenge the state’s conduct. If the agency issued its interpretation after the state
acted on its policy, then a Bowen problem would arise. But no Bowen retroactivity problem exists
if the dispute is merely between the state and the federal government over whether a proposed
state policy is permissible under the grant program.
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analogy, however, it is useful to outline the various possible approaches to
Bennett retroactivity and the values that each advances.
B. Possible Judicial Approaches to Bennett Retroactivity
1. Categorically Deny Chevron Deference
One possible approach to regulations that create questions of Bennett
retroactivity is simply to deny deference. As explained above, this is the
result if one applies the state choice model, because that approach makes
notice dispositive, and a state cannot be said to have received notice of a
condition that did not exist when it accepted funds.168 Under this approach,
if in fact the statutory condition cannot be said clearly to resolve the
circumstances at issue (that is, if the case is not resolvable under Chevron
step one), then the state cannot be bound by the agency’s interpretation as
long as the state has complied with a reasonable interpretation of the
statute. (If the state has acted under an interpretation of the statute that is
unreasonable, of course, then the state would have violated the statutory
condition regardless of what the agency believes the statute to require.)
According to this view—and assuming one applies, as the more general
framework, the state choice model—the state can avoid the agency’s
interpretation until it next accepts funds under the program.169 Although
under programs that distribute funds annually this might not be a very long
time, during that time the state has an effective trump against agency
interpretations that are not mandated by the terms of the statute.
2. Categorically Apply Chevron Deference
The second approach is to apply Chevron deference to reasonable
agency interpretations of statutory conditions regardless of when the agency
issues the interpretation—except, of course, when application of the
regulation would create a problem of Bowen retroactivity. Under this

168. Of course, this is also the result of applying the accountability model, which
categorically precludes deference for all agency interpretations of grant conditions, whenever
issued.
169. At bottom, then, the state choice model treats the question not as one of interpretation,
but as one of remedy. A court’s decision under the state choice model that an agency
interpretation issued after the state has accepted funds cannot give the state adequate notice does
not mean that the agency’s view cannot be law. Instead, it means that the agency’s view of the
condition cannot be enforced against the state until the state again decides—this time with full
notice of the agency’s view—to accept funds under the relevant grant program. In this sense, the
state choice model resembles Justice Harlan’s approach to the validity of selective prospectivity of
new constitutional holdings. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (explaining when
“new” rules of criminal procedure should apply retroactively).
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approach, a state recipient is bound as long as the agency view is
reasonable, and regardless of whether the state’s view also is reasonable.
This view, of course, is inconsistent with the state choice model.170
3. Interpret the Statute de Novo
The third possibility is to treat the statute governing the grant program
as a true contract. Under this approach, a court would resolve the dispute
between the state and the federal government by deciding how the parties
would have intended the ambiguous provision to apply to the particular
circumstances at issue. As in any contract dispute, neither party’s view
automatically would control; the agency would not get any special
deference for its view, but the mere fact that the state’s interpretation is
reasonable also would not be dispositive.
4. Analysis
Denying Chevron deference values state autonomy by preserving the
states’ ability to structure their own affairs. Under this approach, a state
cannot be bound midstream after committing resources in reliance on its
own reasonable interpretation of the grant program’s requirements. There is
an intuitive appeal to a rule that a state grant recipient cannot be bound by a
particular interpretation of an ambiguous statutory condition unless the state
knew at the time that it accepted the funds that the interpretation was in
place. Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances under which a
state acts reasonably and in good faith, only later to be caught by a belated,
contrary federal interpretation of the state’s duties.171

170. It is not necessarily inconsistent, however, with Pennhurst. One could view Pennhurst’s
rule as a means of distinguishing statutory provisions meant to bind states from provisions
expressing hortatory statements of congressional policy. To be fair, however, the Court’s
decisions since Pennhurst suggest that its rule might mean more than that. See supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
171. Consider again the example of the federal grant program that requires states to “assure
that all public school students have reasonably individualized access to technology education.”
Imagine that the state’s education agenda is to provide enough computers to ensure a five-to-one
student-to-computer ratio. Suppose further that the federal funds are not sufficient to cover the
cost fully. If the state receives its appropriation at a time when the Department of Education has
not yet offered its view of the condition, but the Department of Education subsequently issues a
regulation that interprets the condition to require one science teacher for every ten students, then
requiring the state to exhaust the funds—and perhaps some of its own funds—to satisfy the
Department of Education’s view might preclude the state from fulfilling its own educational
objectives. Indeed, had the state known, at the time that the funds were offered, of the Department
of Education’s view—and that acceptance of the funds effectively would preclude the state’s
computer initiative—the state likely would not have accepted funds. The state in this case would
have an appealing argument that the agency’s interpretation, although reasonable, should not bind
it.
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There is, however, a corresponding cost of entitling the state to defeat
the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory grant condition. By
refusing to defer to the agency’s interpretation—at least until the state next
agrees to accept funds—this approach undermines the values that Chevron
is designed to advance: the preservation of executive enforcement
discretion and the implementation of agency expertise. To be sure, these
values are not permanently undermined, because the state would be bound
by the agency’s interpretation when (or if) the state elects to accept funds
again in the next funding cycle. But because this approach would delay
implementation of the agency’s view, it is contrary to the conventional
scope of executive enforcement discretion, which (by definition) often will
entitle the executive to bring an enforcement action in circumstances that in
the past may not have been subject to such actions. Indeed, Chevron was
premised on the assumption that “Congress had delegated to the agency the
legal authority to make those determinations.”172 Similarly, denying
deference is in tension with Chevron’s command that courts “pay particular
attention to the views of an expert agency where they represent ‘specialized
experience.’”173
It is possible to argue that the problem that this approach would
ostensibly remedy—a state’s being caught, after relying on its reasonable
interpretation, by an agency’s belated (and burdensome) interpretation—
may be overstated. Once it is clear that Chevron deference will apply to all
agency interpretations of statutory grant conditions, states arguably will
know, when accepting funds, that they can be bound by any reasonable
agency interpretation. In cases of ambiguity, a state can, before committing
resources based on its own interpretation, seek the guidance of the agency
charged with enforcing the grant program. Thus, Chevron simply would
serve as a default rule in any federal grant “contract.”174
There is, however, a Blackstonian flavor to this critique that may be
inappropriate when judged according to modern notions of retroactivity.
Under Blackstone’s view, courts do not create law but rather discover it;175
new decisions—or decisions overruling prior cases—are treated not as new
law, but as “an application of what is, and theretofore had been, the true

172. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1668 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1667 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
174. See Pennsylvania v. United States, 781 F.2d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying Chevron
deference to uphold a regulation that held states strictly liable for erroneous issuances of benefits
under the Food Stamp Program and rejecting the state’s Pennhurst argument because “[s]urely
states are familiar with the broad discretion Congress accords to agencies that administer and
resolve the ambiguities in complex social welfare programs”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Schweiker,
721 F.2d 170, 183-84 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that federal financial assistance applicants “signed
a very open-ended ‘contract,’ one which conferred a great deal of discretion upon the Secretary to
define the precise measure of their obligations under it”).
175. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965).
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law.”176 To contend that states have, when they accept funds, constructive
notice of any reasonable interpretation that the agency might issue after the
acceptance of funds suggests that the agency’s view is, in some sense,
preordained by the statute. As a practical matter, however, such a view—
like Blackstone’s view of the retroactive application of new judicial
decisions—is pure legal fiction. That this is so is starkly illustrated by the
hypothetical suggested by the Bennett Court: Because Chevron deference is
applicable even to agency interpretations that wholly reverse prior agency
interpretations,177 deferring to agency interpretations issued after the state
accepted funds could result in a state’s being bound by an agency
interpretation of a statutory grant condition that is the opposite of the
agency interpretation in effect when the state accepted funds.178
Nevertheless, there is another problem with allowing states to defeat
reasonable agency interpretations that postdate the state’s receipt of funds.
The most frequently litigated statutory conditions on the acceptance of
federal funds—Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,179 Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,180 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act181—are not attached to any particular grant of funds through any
particular program, but rather are background conditions that bind any
recipient—public or private—of any federal funds.182 When one of these
background conditions is at issue, this approach creates difficult temporal
problems that categorically deferring avoids. Specifically, there is no
obvious way to determine when a state “receives” funds in order to trigger
the applicability of a condition, such as Title IX, that does not come
attached to any particular grant of funds.
This temporal problem is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Rosa H.183 The question presented in that case was whether Title IX
renders liable a public school district that fails to prevent an instructor from
sexually abusing a student. Although Title IX does not provide an answer,
the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, shortly before the
Fifth Circuit issued its decision but after the conduct that gave rise to the
suit, had issued guidelines that advocated application of Title VII’s

176. Id. at 623 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
177. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 149
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
178. See Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 670 (1985).
179. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1994).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
182. Title IX’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination applies only to “education program[s]
or activit[ies] receiving Federal financial assistance,” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), but, like Title VI and
the Rehabilitation Act, it is not itself a grant program.
183. Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
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principles of agency liability.184 The court noted that ordinarily it would
defer to the agency’s interpretation of Title IX, but declined to defer in that
case because it would not apply the guidelines “retroactively.”185
As explained above,186 there is good reason, in both precedent and
policy, to decline to apply agency interpretations of ambiguous grant
conditions to state conduct that predates the issuance of the agency rule.
The Rosa H. court thus was correct to apply (albeit without saying so)
Bowen’s presumption against retroactive application of agency
interpretations. The court in Rosa H., however, spoke in terms of Bennett
retroactivity: According to the court, the agency’s interpretation could not
apply because it was issued after the state received its “Title IX funds.”187
There is, however, no such thing as “Title IX funds.” The court’s error
draws attention to a problem created by refusing to defer to retroactive
agency interpretations—and, indeed, by the state choice model itself.
Because the federal government does not grant funds to states under Title
IX, there is no obvious relevant date for purposes of Pennhurst notice.
Recall, however, that the state choice model places dispositive weight on
the date that the state receives funds. Under an approach that requires courts
to defer regardless of when the agency issued its interpretation, in contrast,
because the agency interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference
regardless of when the state accepted the funds, the absence of a relevant
date for purposes of Pennhurst notice is inconsequential.
This error of the Rosa H. decision becomes apparent when one
considers that most states receive funds under scores of federal grant
programs. For example, suppose that a school district receives annual grants
each January under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965,188 grants each June under the Technology for Education Act of
1994,189 and funds each October under IDEA.190 Imagine further that in
May, the Department of Education issues a regulation that defines what
forms of student-on-student sexual harassment will be considered
184. Id. at 658 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 52,172 (October 4, 1996)). For Title VII principles, see
generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), which held that employers are subject to vicarious liability, under
certain circumstances, for actions of supervisors.
185. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 658.
186. See supra notes 153-167 and accompanying text.
187. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 658 (“The government can add strings to the Title IX funds as it
disburses them. But it cannot modify past agreements with recipients by unilaterally issuing
guidelines through the Department of Education.”).
188. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6302-6338 (1994).
189. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6871 (authorizing the Secretary of Education to distribute federal
funds to “support a comprehensive system for the acquisition and use by elementary and
secondary schools in the United States of technology and technology-enhanced curricula,
instruction, and administrative support resources and services to improve the delivery of
educational services”).
190. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420.
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sufficiently “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively
bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”191
Finally, suppose that in September a student in a public school in that state
harasses, within the Department’s definition of the term, another student,
and the district “acts with deliberate indifference” to the student’s
harassment.192 Assuming that the agency’s interpretation of Title IX—
technically, its definition of “discrimination”—is reasonable, could the
school district be bound by the Department’s regulation? The hypothetical
state plainly accepted some federal funds in that calendar year (and, for that
matter, in that fiscal year), and the issuance of the regulation clearly
presents no retroactivity problem under Bowen, because the agency
promulgated the regulation before the conduct at issue—both the harasser’s
and the district’s—took place. Title IX, however, is not “attached” (in
contrast to, for example, IDEA’s requirement that states assure disabled
students the right to a “free appropriate public education”193) to any
specific grant of funds. What, then, would be the relevant date by which to
measure whether the state had notice of the condition? When the condition
at issue is not program-specific, this temporal question is not answerable by
simple reference to Pennhurst’s notice principles.
Of course, one possible solution to this temporal problem is to apply, as
has the Fourth Circuit, the accountability model and deny Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of all grant conditions, whether
program-specific or non-program-specific. As explained above, however,
this approach unacceptably undervalues the bulk of the interests served by
Chevron and Pennhurst. Refusing to defer is particularly inappropriate,
moreover, in the context of non-program-specific conditions, because, as
conditions that by definition apply to all grants of federal funds, those
conditions are more likely to reflect a definitive congressional statement of
national policy. Indeed, these conditions do not simply serve as restrictions
on the use of federal funds,194 but also set broad, normative limitations on
appropriate state conduct.
Another solution would be to hold that an agency interpretation cannot
bind the state until the state receives its next installment of federal funds,
through whatever program. But when the state constantly receives federal
funds under various programs, this approach seems arbitrary. More
important, this solution underscores the main shortcoming of refusing to
defer to retroactive agency interpretations: Under this approach (regardless

191. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
192. Id.
193. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
194. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-18 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should insist that conditions on grants of federal funds bear a close
relationship to the purpose of the funds); Baker, supra note 11, at 1914 n.11.
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of whether the condition is freestanding or is attached to a particular
program), states would have a trump card that defeats, at least until the next
year’s fund allocation, federally imposed obligations, as long as the state
can offer an alternative reasonable interpretation of the statutory condition.
An approach (such as the state choice model) that categorically refuses
to defer to retroactive agency interpretations is not without both practical
and substantive defects. Limiting Chevron deference to those agency
interpretations that predate the state’s receipt of programmatic funds poses
difficult temporal questions when the condition at issue is not attached to
any particular grant of funds. This approach also arguably leaves
underenforced the conditions that Congress considered most important to
national policy and undermines the values that Chevron is designed to
advance.
The second approach described above—categorically deferring to
agency interpretations, regardless of when they were issued—is the
converse of the first approach. By deferring even to agency interpretations
that postdate the states’ acceptance of funds, this approach advances the
interests served by Chevron. This approach also ensures that federal
mandates do not go unfulfilled simply because of the agency’s timing in
issuing its enforcement guidelines. In addition, categorically deferring
avoids the temporal questions that arise when the grant condition at issue is
not attached to any particular grant of funds. But this approach also at times
will bind to costly burdens states that have acted reasonably and in good
faith.
The categorical approaches thus both have a somewhat unsatisfying
default. Under the first approach, the state (assuming it acts reasonably)
always prevails in a dispute over how a statutory condition applies in new
circumstances, whereas under the second approach, the agency (again,
assuming it acts reasonably) always wins the interpretive dispute. The third
approach described above responds to this all-or-nothing problem by
vesting the power to make the interpretive decision in an objective third
party: the courts. Courts regularly interpret ambiguous contractual
provisions, and although there are competing views of how courts should
resolve such questions—for example, some have argued that courts should
attempt to discern the objective meaning of the terms of the contract,
whereas others have argued that the determinative inquiry is what the
parties would have intended, regardless of the objective meaning of the
terms195—the ultimate task is not unfamiliar to the judicial process.
When private parties enter a contract under which one will provide
funds on the condition that the other take certain actions, the existence of
ambiguity in one of the conditions generally does not entitle the fund
195. E.g., 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9, at 245-48 (1990).

SMITHFINAL.DOC

2001]

APRIL 12, 2001 4/12/01 12:27 PM

Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power

1237

recipient categorically to defeat the application of the term merely by
following its own reasonable interpretation of the provision. Instead, both
parties typically will be bound ultimately by the court’s view of the
provision’s meaning. For example, imagine that a person contracts to pay a
carpenter to build a house, that the contract provides that the carpenter
“shall substantially complete work by January 1, 2001,” and that, as of that
date, the carpenter has completed sixty percent of the work, which he
believes satisfies the contractual condition. If the prospective homeowner
interprets the clause to require seventy-five percent completion by the
required date and sues for breach, the court would not automatically
construe the contract to mean that sixty percent satisfies the condition, even
though that certainly would be a plausible reading of the provision. The
mere fact that the carpenter received funds with a condition attached does
not entitle the carpenter to defeat the other party’s interpretation simply by
invoking an alternative reasonable interpretation. That is not to say, of
course, that the prospective homeowner’s interpretation automatically
would prevail, but the private contract analogy at least suggests that there is
nothing inherent in the receipt of conditioned funds that entitles the
recipient unilaterally to impose its view of the meaning of the conditions on
the other party.
The private contract analogy thus suggests that the first approach
above, under which a state can, simply by following an alternative
reasonable interpretation of a statutory condition that is ambiguous in its
application to particular circumstances, avoid an agency’s interpretation,
treats states better than similarly situated private parties. But if, as the
Pennhurst Court suggested, contract principles truly are the relevant rules
of decision, then perhaps state grant recipients should be treated as any
other similarly situated contracting party. To be sure, one could also draw
from the private contract analogy that neither should the grantor be entitled
categorically to impose its interpretation of any ambiguous contract term.
Indeed, the point of the private analogy is that the court, and not any one
party, gets to decide the meaning of the disputed contractual term. But
when courts interpret contracts between private parties, principles of
administrative deference typically are irrelevant.196 When the grantor is the
federal government, on the other hand, Chevron’s values argue in favor of
judicial deference to the federal government’s interpretation of the
ambiguity. Pure judicial interpretation—that is, without deference to agency
views—might make perfect sense when private parties dispute the meaning
of a contract, because there are no countervailing institutional interests

196. There are times, of course, when the meaning of a term in a contract between private
parties turns on a government agency’s interpretation, or when an agency interpretation
determines the scope of a private party’s contractual rights.
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(such as the promotion of agency expertise and the preservation of
executive enforcement discretion) to be served. Judicial construction,
without deference, of the terms of federal grant programs, however, impairs
these competing institutional values. Indeed, the Court in Chevron weighed
these competing interests and sensibly concluded that, although there is
value in preserving the judiciary’s ultimate role in construing statutes, the
interest in judicial supremacy does not entirely trump the need for executive
discretion and agency expertise. Those interests are no less compelling
when the ambiguous statutory provision is a condition to a grant of federal
funds.
The third approach thus has its own, quite significant defect: It seems
flatly inconsistent with Chevron. Although courts routinely interpret the
terms in contracts between private parties, those cases typically do not
implicate the same governmental interests that are at stake when Congress
enacts the disputed terms. The mere fact, therefore, that courts are
competent to interpret private contracts does not mean that courts should
ignore, simply because Pennhurst is premised on quasi-contract principles,
the limitations that Chevron imposed on the judicial role.
Indeed, the closest analogy to cases that involve Bennett retroactivity—
a contract in which the federal government grants funds to a private party to
take some action to benefit the government—suggests that a state (as a fund
recipient) should not be able automatically to avoid one reasonable
interpretation of a grant condition simply because it has relied on an
alternative reasonable interpretation. Quite to the contrary, that analogy
suggests that the federal government’s reasoned interpretation of statutory
contract terms is entitled to deference. When the payer of the funds is the
federal government, as opposed to a private party, and the recipient is a
private party, the values advanced by Chevron generally entitle the relevant
agency to impose on the grant recipient the agency’s interpretation of the
contract, even if the agency issues the interpretation after the parties entered
the contract.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which the federal
government contracts with a private manufacturer to build a prototype of a
plane. Imagine that Congress passes a statute that provides (similar to the
private contract hypothetical above) that the Department of Defense will
grant the manufacturer ten million dollars to construct the plane, and that
the grant is conditioned on the manufacturer’s “substantially completing”
work on the prototype “by January 1, 2001.” Suppose further that after the
Department grants the funds to the manufacturer (but before January 1,
2001), the Department issues a regulation that defines “substantially
complete” to mean seventy-five percent complete. Finally, imagine that on
January 1, 2001, the manufacturer has completed sixty percent of the
project. If the Department sues the contractor for breach (or if the
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Department refuses to allocate further funds and the manufacturer sues), the
court most likely would apply Chevron deference to the Department’s view
of the contract.197
The only difference in cases of Bennett retroactivity is that the fund
recipient is a state rather than a private party. When Congress offers the
states funds with strings attached, the federal government’s objective is that
the states will accomplish some federal policy goal, and the “consideration”
is the granted money itself. Similarly, the states’ objective is to obtain funds
to support their programs, and the “consideration” is the promise to abide
by the conditions attached to the funds. In this way, federal-state grant
programs resemble common contracts in which one party (either the
government or a private party) pays another private party to accomplish
some predetermined goal. Indeed, this was the premise of Pennhurst. In
such cases, the interests served by Chevron are as compelling as they are
when the fund recipient is a private party; the agency still has a strong
interest in applying its expertise, the executive still has a significant interest
in exercising its enforcement discretion, and the courts have an institutional
interest in promoting that expertise and discretion.
When the fund recipient is a state, there is, to be sure, a countervailing
interest in preserving state autonomy, and this interest must be considered
in deciding whether courts should defer to agency interpretations issued
after a state accepts funds. But Chevron’s values themselves—which turn,
at least in part, on considerations of horizontal separation of powers—are
unaffected by these considerations of vertical separation of powers. And, as
I have argued above, the interest in state autonomy is insufficient to trump
Chevron’s values when the agency’s interpretation of the grant condition
predates the state’s receipt of funds. The ultimate question, then, is whether

197. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Garrett, 6 F.3d 1547, 1561
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying Chevron deference to uphold a provision in Federal Acquisition
Regulations, which are default terms in government procurement contracts). There is, to be sure,
an argument that the common-law interpretive rule of contra proferentem (“against the profferer”)
would prevent the government from imposing its interpretation of the grant condition on the state
recipient. Under that rule, “if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two
interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party that
supplied the language is preferred.” 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 195, § 7.11, at 265. The rule,
however, is inapposite in the context of federal-state grant programs. First, the doctrine is
primarily designed to protect a weaker party against bargaining imbalance, and it has particular
application in cases involving adhesion contracts. Although some commentators have argued that
federal grants are, in light of resource imbalances, inherently coercive, see supra notes 116-120
and accompanying text, one can hardly argue that grants of federal funds to the states are adhesion
contracts. Second, if one takes Garcia at its word, then the states have had, in a sense, some say in
the drafting of the “contract,” because the federal representatives have taken into account the
needs of the states in crafting the grant scheme. Finally, application of the doctrine to federal-state
grant statutes would undermine other values in this context; as explained above, categorical
acceptance of the states’ interpretations of grant conditions would, in effect, require Congress to
legislate at an impossible (and undesirable) level of specificity, and would undermine the values
advanced by Chevron.
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Chevron’s values should be thought to trump the states’ interest in
maintaining decisionmaking autonomy in that narrow category of cases in
which the agency issues its interpretation of the grant condition after the
state accepts funds.
There is another problem—perhaps a corollary of the approach’s
tension with Chevron itself—with allowing the court to interpret the statute
without applying any deference to the agency’s view. In many cases, the
court will have no identifiable reason to prefer one reading of the statute
over another. To illustrate this point, consider again the hypothetical
technology education program under which state recipients of federal funds
must “assure that all public school students have reasonably individualized
access to technology education.”198 The state’s view of the condition
(which requires lowering the student-to-computer ratio) is certainly as
reasonable as the agency’s view (which requires lowering the student-toteacher ratio). Assuming that the legislative history doesn’t address the
dispute, what principles would a court apply in determining what the statute
requires?
Imagine instead that the dispute between the agency and the state were
not over computers versus teachers, but rather simply were over the exact
student-to-computer ratio required. How would a court decide whether fiveto-one or ten-to-one is a correct reading of the statute? The virtue of
Chevron’s rule is that when Congress has delegated substantive rulemaking
authority—that is, the authority to fill in gaps in a statute’s application—to
an agency, a court has no reason to prefer one view to another, while the
expert agency does. Of course, one could respond that the state has as much
interest and expertise in the problem (here, education, a local matter) as
does the agency, and that the state should get to decide. But typically the
party on whom a burden has been imposed is not allowed to decide for
itself the extent of the burden.
It would not be unreasonable to conclude, in light of general contract
principles and the interests that Chevron serves, that states should (absent
the Bowen retroactivity problems described above) be bound even by
agency interpretations that postdate the state’s acceptance of funds.
Elemental notions of fairness for the state recipients give pause, however,
especially when one considers the hypotheticals of the agency’s reversing
its prior view or the state’s committing the grant funds in reliance on its
own reasonable view, only to learn later that the agency has a different
(albeit reasonable) view. Because the question is such a close one, below I
consider some alternative approaches.

198. Supra p. 1189.
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C. Alternative Approaches to Bennett Retroactivity
There is virtue in a categorical rule for the treatment of agency
interpretations of statutory grant conditions. Nevertheless, there are other
analytical frameworks that could conceivably apply in determining whether
the federal government can bind a state with an agency’s belated
interpretation of a statutory grant condition. The most promising, at least at
first blush, is the distinction made by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)199 between interpretive rules and substantive (or “legislative”) rules.
Although this distinction is important in the APA context primarily in
answering the procedural question whether an agency is required to satisfy
the Act’s notice-and-comment requirements, it has an intuitive relevance in
deciding whether an agency interpretation that postdates a state’s receipt of
funds should bind the state.
Under the APA, notice-and-comment rulemaking is not required for
“interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice.”200 Generally speaking, “[t]he agency,
by issuing its [interpretive rule], asserts that existing legislation already has
established by implication the position that the agency interpretation now
specifies. The interpretation, therefore, does not project new legal effect of
its own.”201 An agency statement thus typically is considered interpretive if
it is “issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction
of the statutes and rules which it administers”;202 if it is “explicitly based
upon an analysis of the meaning of the statute or regulation”;203 or if it
“deals with an aspect of [a statute] . . . already prescribed in detail by
Congress.”204 A rule is substantive, in contrast, if Congress delegated
“legislative power to the agency” and the agency “intended to use that
power.”205 In general, a substantive rule “fill[s] in the gaps in a complicated
regulatory scheme”206 and “create[s] new law, rights, or duties.”207 The
question whether a rule is interpretive or legislative thus often depends on
“how tightly the agency’s interpretation is drawn linguistically from the
actual language of the statute or rule.”208 A rule is not legislative “merely

199. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
200. Id. § 553(b)(A).
201. Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules:
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 13 (1994).
202. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
203. Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 237 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
204. Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 558.
206. Id. at 559 (citation omitted); accord Nat’l Family Planning, 979 F.2d at 237.
207. Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
208. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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because it supplies crisper and more detailed lines than the authority being
interpreted”;209 instead, “the legislative or interpretive status of the agency
rules turns not in some general sense on the narrowness or breadth of the
statutory (or regulatory) term in question, but on the prior existence or nonexistence of legal duties and rights.”210
If one assumes (contrary to the accountability model) that reasonable
agency interpretations issued before a state accepts federal funds can bind
the state, but, consistent with the state choice model, that there is some
unfairness in binding the state to an agency interpretation issued after the
state accepts funds, then one possible solution to cases of Bennett
retroactivity is to allow only interpretive rules to bind the state. Indeed, the
principal unfairness in giving binding force to the agency’s interpretation
occurs in cases in which the state did not anticipate the agency’s view and
made decisions (and committed funds) based on an alternative reasonable
view of the statutory condition’s application.211 Because an interpretive
rule merely explains what “existing legislation already has established by
implication,” there is no unfairness in binding a state to agency interpretive
rules. In such cases, the state (at least theoretically) by definition has
received adequate notice from the statute itself of its application to the
circumstances at issue. Substantive (or legislative) rules, on the other hand,
create “new” duties beyond those that the grant statute itself explicitly or
implicitly creates—and therefore purport to impose obligations that the
state recipients could not specifically have anticipated.
Although there is some analytical appeal in using the distinction
between interpretive and substantive rules to determine whether an agency
interpretation that suffers from Bennett retroactivity should bind a state
recipient of federal funds, there is good reason not to follow this approach.
The ostensible virtue of the approach is that it helps to identify those
situations in which there is no unfairness to the state—those situations, that
is, in which the state in effect should have known from the statute that it
would be bound by the agency’s subsequent interpretation. In practice,
however, “[d]etermining whether a given agency action is interpretive or
legislative is an extraordinarily case-specific endeavor.”212 Indeed,
although it is not difficult to state in generic terms the difference between
interpretive and substantive rules, the distinction often is blurred in
practice,213 and courts accordingly have struggled in characterizing agency
statements.214
209. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
210. Id. at 1110.
211. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
212. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
213. For example, although one hallmark of a substantive rule is that it creates new legal
duties, Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1991), courts have noted that
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Another possible analytic framework is the nondelegation doctrine
itself. That doctrine prevents Congress from transferring the legislative
power—that is, the “open-ended discretion to choose ends” within the
“affirmative reach of federal authority”215—to other agents, principally to
administrative agencies. Congress therefore may grant to agencies the
authority to issue substantive rules if Congress has cabined that authority by
establishing—even if only in general terms—the objectives of the
regulatory program; accordingly, the Court will uphold a delegation of
authority to an agency to promulgate rules if Congress has provided
intelligible standards for the exercise of that authority. 216 The
nondelegation doctrine, broadly stated, serves at least two important
functions: It ensures that “important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
will”;217 and, by requiring that Congress specify standards for the exercise
of the delegated power, it facilitates judicial review of the validity of that
power once exercised.218
So stated, the nondelegation doctrine supplies a possible analytical
framework for judging agency interpretations of statutory grant conditions.
Indeed, as explained above, the accountability model’s concern really is
another way of stating a concern about delegation. As it currently stands,
however, the nondelegation doctrine is satisfied when Congress expresses,
at a comparatively broad level of generality, the ends of the federal

“interpretive rules may have a substantial impact on the rights of individuals.” Am. Postal
Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Similarly, courts
generally consider a rule interpretive if it is “explicitly based upon an analysis of the meaning of
the statute or regulation.” Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d
227, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1992). But that almost always is the case, at least in some sense, with
legislative rules as well. And the ambiguity is not easily resolved by the principal element in the
test that the courts apply to determine whether a rule is interpretive or substantive: “whether in the
absence of the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or
other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties.” Am. Mining Cong.,
995 F.2d at 1112. That inquiry merely begs the question.
214. See, e.g., Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“We have long
recognized that it is quite difficult to distinguish between substantive and interpretive rules.”); Am.
Hosp. Ass’n, 834 F.2d at 1045 (stating that the “spectrum between a clearly interpretive rule and a
clearly substantive one is a hazy continuum”); Gen. Motors v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is
“enshrouded in considerable smog”).
215. TRIBE, supra note 75, at 982.
216. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“So long as Congress
‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928))).
217. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
218. See id. at 686; TRIBE, supra note 75, at 364-65.
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enactment; Congress need only provide “intelligible” standards to fulfill its
obligation to retain the legislative power.219
To be sure, a number of judges and commentators have suggested that
the current nondelegation doctrine does not impose adequate limits on
Congress and inappropriately entitles Congress to punt important policy
decisions to agency decisionmakers and, ultimately, to the courts.220 These
concerns are not insubstantial, but they are beyond the scope of this Essay.
It suffices to note here that a delegation model would appear to address
many of the concerns about agencies’ power to interpret statutory
provisions, including statutory conditions on state recipients of federal
funds; and if the nondelegation doctrine as currently applied does not, in all
contexts (including grant programs), adequately limit the power of
Congress to give away the legislative power, then perhaps a revision of that
doctrine is in order. As matters currently stand, however, the nondelegation
doctrine, which identifies the outer limits of Congress’s power to permit
agencies to fill in the gaps in statutory schemes, is not violated when an
agency issues—either before or after a state accepts federal funds—its
interpretation of a statutory grant condition that plainly imposes some
burden on the state recipients.
IV. CONCLUSION
Narrowly construed, Pennhurst is a sensible (even if not necessary)
process-based limitation on Congress’s power to bind states to costly
burdens. If read to mean that a state can never be bound by a grant
condition when the statute itself does not unmistakably speak to a particular
set of circumstances, however, Pennhurst becomes a substantive limitation
on federal authority that significantly impairs Congress’s ability to
accomplish national goals. And if one reads Pennhurst to support the

219. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
220. See, e.g., id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What legislated standard, one must wonder,
can possibly be too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various
contexts, a ‘public interest’ standard?”); Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“We ought not to shy away from our judicial duty to invalidate
unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority solely out of concern that we should thereby
reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New Deal era. If the nondelegation
doctrine has fallen into the same desuetude as have substantive due process and restrictive
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, it is, as one writer has phrased it, ‘a case of death by
association.’” (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 133 (1980))); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Silberman,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“But, sad to say, [Justice Rehnquist’s view in
American Petroleum Institute] is not shared by a majority of the Court which has acknowledged
only a theoretical limitation on the scope of congressional delegations to the executive branch.”),
rev’d in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001); JAMES O.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 78-94 (1978).
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accountability model, then Pennhurst not only unduly impairs federal
authority, but also undermines the interests served by Chevron; indeed, so
read, Pennhurst would jeopardize the functioning of the administrative state
itself.
As I have explained, the question whether a reasonable agency
interpretation that postdates a state’s receipt of funds should bind the state
is a close one. A conclusion that it should, although plausible, would be
easier to swallow if some exceptions to the rule were created. Perhaps, for
example, a state should not, notwithstanding an express waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in accepting federal funds, be held liable for
damages in a private suit challenging conduct that is unlawful only under
the agency’s belated interpretation. And perhaps, if one were to adopt an
approach of categorically deferring, there could be an exception when the
agency reverses the interpretation that was in force when the state accepted
funds. At bottom, however, the question requires a difficult balancing
between values that are not easily quantified: state decisionmaking
autonomy, on the one hand, and the separation of powers and the
application of specialized governmental expertise to concrete problems, on
the other. Whichever approach is correct, the question has assumed
increased importance as the Supreme Court has closed (or at least erected
barriers to) other avenues for the exercise of federal authority over the
states. As the federal government increasingly turns to conditioned
spending as a means of accomplishing national objectives, this question
becomes correspondingly less academic. Its resolution will provide a degree
of welcome clarity both for regulators in the federal government and for
state recipients of federal funds.

